Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet
Computer Science and Game Theory
2012-06-07 v1
Abstract
The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we propose that if agents report messages to the designer through channels (e.g., Internet), agents can construct a self-enforcing agreement such that any Pareto-inefficient social choice rule satisfying monotonicity and no-veto will not be Nash implementable when an additional condition is satisfied. The key points are: 1) The agreement is unobservable to the designer, and the designer cannot prevent the agents from constructing such agreement; 2) The agents act non-cooperatively, and the Maskin mechanism remain unchanged from the designer's perspective.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1206.1188,
title = {Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet},
author = {Haoyang Wu},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1206.1188},
year = {2012}
}
Comments
17 pages, 1 figure. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1004.5327