Related papers: Plurality in Spatial Voting Games with constant $\…
By relaxing the dominating set in three ways (e.g., from "each member beats every non-member" to "each member beats or ties every non-member, with an additional requirement that at least one member beat every non-member"), we propose a new…
Spherical symmetry arguments are used to produce a general device to convert identities and inequalities for the $p$th absolute moments of real-valued random variables into the corresponding identities and inequalities for the $p$th moments…
Let $\Omega$ be a bounded, smooth domain. Supposing that $\alpha(p) + \beta(p) = p$, $\forall\, p \in \left(\frac{N}{s},\infty\right)$ and $\displaystyle\lim_{p \to \infty} \alpha(p)/{p} = \theta \in (0,1)$, we consider two systems for the…
The median voter theorem has long been the default model of voter behavior and candidate choice. While contemporary work on the distribution of political opinion has emphasized polarization and an increasing gap between the "left" and the…
The Born rule provides a probability vector (distribution) with a quantum state for a measurement setting. For two settings, we have a pair of vectors from the same quantum state. Each pair forms a combined-probability vector that obeys…
A method for studying exact properties of a class of {\it inhomogeneous} stochastic many-body systems is developed and presented in the framework of a voter model perturbed by the presence of a ``zealot'', an individual allowed to favour an…
This article aims to present a unified framework for grading-based voting processes. The idea is to represent the grades of each voter on d candidates as a point in R^d and to define the winner of the vote using the deepest point of the…
We generalize Condorcet's jury theorem (CJT) to socially connected populations in which agents revise discrete choices on a network in the presence of zealots. Free agents receive privately informative signals about the correct alternative…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
Majority voting (MV) is the prototypical ``wisdom of the crowd'' algorithm. Theorems considering when MV is optimal for group decisions date back to Condorcet's 1785 jury \emph{decision} theorem. The same error independence assumption…
The constrained voter model describes the dynamics of opinions in a population of individuals located on a connected graph. Each agent is characterized by her opinion, where the set of opinions is represented by a finite sequence of…
We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…
We present a systematic study of Plurality elections with strategic voters who, in addition to having preferences over election winners, have secondary preferences, which govern their behavior when their vote cannot affect the election…
Repeated sampling is a standard way to spend test-time compute, but its benefit is controlled by the latent distribution of correctness across examples, not by one-call accuracy alone. We study the binary correctness layer of repeated LLM…
Given a large finite point set, $P\subset \mathbb R^2$, we obtain upper bounds on the number of triples of points that determine a given pair of dot products. That is, for any pair of positive real numbers, $(\alpha, \beta)$, we bound the…
We investigate coarsening and persistence in the voter model by introducing the quantity $P_n(t)$, defined as the fraction of voters who changed their opinion n times up to time t. We show that $P_n(t)$ exhibits scaling behavior that…
We present theoretical and empirical results demonstrating the usefulness of voting rules for participatory democracies. We first give algorithms which efficiently elicit \epsilon-approximations to two prominent voting rules: the Borda rule…
The Plurality problem - introduced by Aigner \cite{A2004} - has many variants. In this article we deal with the following version: suppose we are given $n$ balls, each of them colored by one of three colors. A \textit{plurality ball} is one…
The voter model with stirring is a variant of the classical voter model on $\mathbb{Z}^d$ with two possible opinions (0 and 1) that, in addition to copying neighbouring opinions at rate 1, allows voters to interchange their opinions at…
The voting process is formalized as a multistage voting model with successive alternative elimination. A finite number of agents vote for one of the alternatives each round subject to their preferences. If the number of votes given to the…