Related papers: Plurality in Spatial Voting Games with constant $\…
Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation of the preferences of multiple agents into a joint decision. If preferences are binary, i.e., "yes" and "no", every voting system can be described by a (monotone) Boolean function…
In Hotelling's model of spatial competition, a unit mass of voters is distributed in the interval $[0,1]$ (with their location corresponding to their political persuasion), and each of $m$ candidates selects as a strategy his distinct…
Let $\beta \equiv \{ \beta_\mathbf{i} \}_{\mathbf{i} \in \mathbb{Z}_+^d}$ be a $d$-dimensional multisequence. Curto and Fialkow, have shown that if the infinite moment matrix $M(\beta)$ is finite-rank positive semidefinite, then $\beta$ has…
We consider the dynamics of the voter model and of the monomer-monomer catalytic process in the presence of many ``competing'' inhomogeneities and show, through exact calculations and numerical simulations, that their presence results in a…
In decision-making problems under uncertainty, probabilistic constraints are a valuable tool to express safety of decisions. They result from taking the probability measure of a given set of random inequalities depending on the decision…
Here we present \texttt{electoral\_sim}, an open-source Python framework for simulating and comparing electoral systems across diverse voter preference distributions. The framework represents voters and candidates as points in a…
The standard three-state voter model is enlarged by including the outside pressure favouring one of the three choices and by adding some biased internal random noise. The Monte Carlo simulations are motivated by states with the population…
Much research in electoral control -- one of the most studied form of electoral attacks, in which an entity running an election alters the structure of that election to yield a preferred outcome -- has focused on giving decision complexity…
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explore which (if any) fairness guarantees can be provided under…
The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two common - but very different - ways to measure the…
We consider a two-round election model involving $m$ voters and $n$ candidates. Each voter is endowed with a strict preference list ranking the candidates. In the first round, the candidates are partitioned into two subsets, $A$ and $B$,…
We investigate the three-state majority-vote model with noise on scale-free and regular networks. In this model, an individual selects an opinion equal to the opinion of the majority of its neighbors with probability $1 - q$ and opposite to…
If a measure of voting power assigns players greater voting power because they no longer effectively cooperate, then it displays the quarrelling paradox and violates the quarrel postulate. However, we prove that certain types of quarrel…
The Majority is Stablest Theorem has numerous applications in hardness of approximation and social choice theory. We give a new proof of the Majority is Stablest Theorem by induction on the dimension of the discrete cube. Unlike the…
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
Condorcet's jury theorem states that the correct outcome is reached in direct majority voting systems with sufficiently large electorates as long as each voter's independent probability of voting for that outcome is greater than 0.5. Yet,…
The voter model is a toy model of consensus formation based on nearest-neighbor interactions. A voter sits at each vertex in a hypercubic lattice (of dimension $d$) and is in one of two possible opinion states. The opinion state of each…
We characterise multi-candidate pure-strategy equilibria in the Hotelling-Downs spatial election model for the class of best-worst voting rules, in which each voter is endowed with both a positive and a negative vote, i.e., each voter can…
We study the 3D-Euclidean Multidimensional Stable Roommates problem, which asks whether a given set $V$ of $s\cdot n$ agents with a location in 3-dimensional Euclidean space can be partitioned into $n$ disjoint subsets $\pi = \{R_1 ,\dots ,…
The remoteness from a simple game to a weighted game can be measured by the concept of the dimension or the more general Boolean dimension. It is known that both notions can be exponential in the number of voters. For complete simple games…