Related papers: On the Structure of Stable Tournament Solutions
We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. The central concepts of this methodology are maximal qualified subsets and minimal stable sets. We thus obtain an infinite hierarchy of…
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide conditions…
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 for which the Banks set and the bipartisan set are disjoint. This implies that…
Tournament solutions provide methods for selecting the "best" alternatives from a tournament and have found applications in a wide range of areas. Previous work has shown that several well-known tournament solutions almost never rule out…
The theory of optimal choice sets offers a well-established solution framework in social choice and game theory. In social choice theory, decision-making is typically modeled as a maximization problem. However, when preferences are cyclic…
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that…
The theory of optimal choice sets is a solution theory that has a long and well-established tradition in social choice and game theories. Some of important general solution concepts of choice problems when the set of best alternatives does…
We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…
We propose a notion of a stable partition in a coalitional game that is parametrized by the concept of a defection function. This function assigns to each partition of the grand coalition a set of different coalition arrangements for a…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
We consider one variant of stable assignment problems in a bipartite graph endowed with nonnegative capacities on the edges and quotas on the vertices. It can be viewed as a generalization of the stable allocation problem introduced by…
In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all…
The evaluation of general-purpose artificial agents, particularly those based on LLMs, presents a significant challenge due to the non-transitive nature of their interactions. When agent A defeats B, B defeats C, and C defeats A,…
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…
In this paper, we study properties and patterns on permutations of multisets whose multivariate generating functions are symmetric. We interpret this phenomenon through the lens of group actions and define such a property or pattern as…
In this paper, we consider one-to-one matchings between two disjoint groups of agents. Each agent has a preference over a subset of the agents in the other group, and these preferences may contain ties. Strong stability is one of the…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
Feature selection, as a vital dimension reduction technique, reduces data dimension by identifying an essential subset of input features, which can facilitate interpretable insights into learning and inference processes. Algorithmic…
We provide a problem definition of the stable marriage problem for a general number of parties $p$ under a natural preference scheme in which each person has simple lists for the other parties. We extend the notion of stability in a natural…