The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint
Theoretical Economics
2025-05-27 v3
Abstract
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 for which the Banks set and the bipartisan set are disjoint. This implies that refinements of the Banks set, such as the minimal extending set and the tournament equilibrium set, can also be disjoint from the bipartisan set.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2308.01881,
title = {The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint},
author = {Felix Brandt and Florian Grundbacher},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.01881},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
7 pages, 1 figure