Related papers: Partially Observed Discrete-Time Risk-Sensitive Me…
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…
Mean field games (MFGs) offer a powerful framework for modeling large-scale multi-agent systems. This paper addresses MFGs formulated in continuous time with discrete state spaces, where agents' dynamics are governed by continuous-time…
We introduce the concept of {\it mean-field optimal control} which is the rigorous limit process connecting finite dimensional optimal control problems with ODE constraints modeling multi-agent interactions to an infinite dimensional…
In this paper, we study the problem of multiple stochastic agents interacting in a dynamic game scenario with continuous state and action spaces. We define a new notion of stochastic Nash equilibrium for boundedly rational agents, which we…
In this article we consider risk-sensitive control of semi-Markov processes with a discrete state space. We consider general utility functions and discounted cost in the optimization criteria. We consider random finite horizon and infinite…
We investigate the existence of an optimal policy to monitor a mean field systems of agents managing a risky project under moral hazard with accidents modeled by L\'evy processes magnified by the law of the project. We provide a general…
We investigate a stochastic differential game in which a major player has a private information (the knowledge of a random variable), which she discloses through her control to a population of small players playing in a Nash Mean Field Game…
This paper studies social optimal control of mean field LQG (linear-quadratic-Gaussian) models with uncertainty. Specially, the uncertainty is represented by a uncertain drift which is common for all agents. A robust optimization approach…
We study Nash equilibria for a sequence of symmetric $N$-player stochastic games of finite-fuel capacity expansion with singular controls and their mean-field game (MFG) counterpart. We construct a solution of the MFG via a simple iterative…
We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of $n$-player equilibria converges to it as $n\to\infty$. However, both the finite and…
The aim of this paper is to study first order Mean field games subject to a linear controlled dynamics on $\mathbb R^{d}$. For this kind of problems, we define Nash equilibria (called Mean Field Games equilibria), as Borel probability…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…
Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous $N$-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population…
Inspired by successful biological collective decision mechanisms such as honey bees searching for a new colony or the collective navigation of fish schools, we consider a mean field games (MFG)-like scenario where a large number of agents…
In this paper, we study deterministic mean field games for agents who operate in a bounded domain. In this case, the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria cannot be deduced as for unrestricted state space because, for a large set of…
This paper builds on the work of Degond, Herty and Liu by considering N-player stochastic differential games. The control corresponding to a Nash equilibrium of such a game is approximated through model predictive control (MPC) techniques.…
We study a sequence of symmetric $n$-player stochastic differential games driven by both idiosyncratic and common sources of noise, in which players interact with each other through their empirical distribution. The unique Nash equilibrium…
Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this context, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global…
In this paper, we consider a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion in which several interacting populations evolving in $\mathbb R^d$ aim at reaching given target sets in minimal time. The movement of each agent is described by a…
We study a mean field game in continuous time over a finite horizon, T, where the state of each agent is binary and where players base their strategic decisions on two, possibly competing, factors: the willingness to align with the majority…