On the (in)efficiency of MFG equilibria
Optimization and Control
2018-02-20 v1
Abstract
Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this context, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global planner can achieve. We find a structure condition on the game under which there exists efficient MFG equilibria and, in case this condition is not fulfilled, quantify how inefficient MFG equilibria are.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1802.06637,
title = {On the (in)efficiency of MFG equilibria},
author = {Pierre Cardaliaguet and Catherine Rainer},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.06637},
year = {2018}
}