Related papers: On Reinforcement Learning for Turn-based Zero-sum …
Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) interleaves empirical game-theoretic analysis with deep reinforcement learning (DRL) to solve games too complex for traditional analytic methods. Tree-exploiting PSRO (TE-PSRO) is a variant of this…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the {\em best response policy}, which was proposed by Kearns et al. \cite{kls} as a way to represent all…
We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium of a two-player, bilinear game with a bounded payoff matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$, when the players' strategies are constrained to lie in simple sets. We…
This work presents a novel policy iteration algorithm to tackle nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games arising naturally in many applications. Despite the obvious impact of solving such problems, there are no suitable numerical methods…
This paper studies policy optimization algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning. We begin by proposing an algorithm framework for two-player zero-sum Markov Games in the full-information setting, where each iteration consists of a…
In this paper, we investigate the impact of introducing relative entropy regularization on the Nash Equilibria (NE) of General-Sum $N$-agent games, revealing the fact that the NE of such games conform to linear Gaussian policies. Moreover,…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is increasingly used to design learning-enabled agents that interact in shared environments. However, training MARL algorithms in general-sum games remains challenging: learning dynamics can become…
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in…
This work designs and analyzes a novel set of algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) based on the principle of information-directed sampling (IDS). These algorithms draw inspiration from foundational concepts in…
We study Nash equilibrium learning in partially observable Markov games (POMGs), a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework in which agents cannot fully observe the underlying state. Prior work in this setting relies on centralization…
We study data corruption robustness in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. Given a dataset of realized trajectories of two players, an adversary is allowed to modify an $\epsilon$-fraction of it. The learner's goal is to identify an…
We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the…
We study decentralized learning in two-player zero-sum discounted Markov games where the goal is to design a policy optimization algorithm for either agent satisfying two properties. First, the player does not need to know the policy of the…
Zero-sum games have long guided artificial intelligence research, since they possess both a rich strategy space of best-responses and a clear evaluation metric. What's more, competition is a vital mechanism in many real-world multi-agent…
We study episodic two-player zero-sum Markov games (MGs) in the offline setting, where the goal is to find an approximate Nash equilibrium (NE) policy pair based on a dataset collected a priori. When the dataset does not have uniform…
The works of (Daskalakis et al., 2009, 2022; Jin et al., 2022; Deng et al., 2023) indicate that computing Nash equilibria in multi-player Markov games is a computationally hard task. This fact raises the question of whether or not…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…