Related papers: Efficiency Axioms for simplicial complexes
The efficiency of a game is typically quantified by the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the worst ratio of the objective function value of an equilibrium --- solution of the game --- and that of an optimal outcome. Given the tremendous…
A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria are given. Known existence theorems are shown to be…
Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by…
We propose a notion of a stable partition in a coalitional game that is parametrized by the concept of a defection function. This function assigns to each partition of the grand coalition a set of different coalition arrangements for a…
A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a…
We use the Minority Game and some of its variants to show how efficiency depends on learning in models of agents competing for limited resources. Exact results from statistical physics give a clear understanding of the phenomenology, and…
Coreness represents solution concepts related to core in cooperative games, which captures the stability of players. Motivated by the scale effect in social networks, economics and other scenario, we study the coreness of cooperative game…
Variational inequalities (VIs) are a broad class of optimization problems encompassing machine learning problems ranging from standard convex minimization to more complex scenarios like min-max optimization and computing the equilibria of…
We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL…
We study the emergence of cooperative behaviors in reinforcement learning agents by introducing a challenging competitive multi-agent soccer environment with continuous simulated physics. We demonstrate that decentralized, population-based…
We consider a cooperative game defined by an economic lot-sizing problem with heterogeneous costs over a finite time horizon, in which each firm faces demand for a single product in each period and coalitions can pool orders. The model of…
Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several…
Efficient engineered systems require scalability. A scalable system has increasing performance with increasing system size. In an ideal case, the increase in performance (e.g., speedup) corresponds to the number of units that are added to…
The objective is to find a Cellular Automata (CA) rule that can evolve 2D patterns that are optimal with respect to a global fitness function. The global fitness is defined as the sum of local computed utilities. A utility or value function…
Many high-stakes decision-making problems, such as those found within cybersecurity and economics, can be modeled as competitive resource allocation games. In these games, multiple players must allocate limited resources to overcome their…
In this work, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is nontrivial, as some authors found that heterogeneity sustains cooperation, while others obtained…
Team assembly is a problem that demands trade-offs between multiple fairness criteria and computational optimization. We focus on four criteria: (i) fair distribution of workloads within the team, (ii) fair distribution of skills and…
This paper studies the connections between mean-field games and the social welfare optimization problems. We consider a mean field game in functional spaces with a large population of agents, each of which seeks to minimize an individual…