Related papers: Efficiency Axioms for simplicial complexes
Two straightforward methods to extend an assessment of individual elements to groups are to sum individual assessments or to treat the group as a single merged element and assess it accordingly. In this work, we analyze another natural…
We investigate the application of the Shapley value to quantifying the contribution of a tuple to a query answer. The Shapley value is a widely known numerical measure in cooperative game theory and in many applications of game theory for…
Humans and other intelligent agents often rely on collective decision making based on an intuition that groups outperform individuals. However, at present, we lack a complete theoretical understanding of when groups perform better. Here we…
The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. In coalitional games without externalities, it allows to compute a unique payoff division that meets certain desirable fairness axioms. However, in…
High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have suggested for different data…
This paper studies competitions with rank-based reward among a large number of teams. Within each sizable team, we consider a mean-field contribution game in which each team member contributes to the jump intensity of a common Poisson…
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more…
In this paper, the total payoff of each agent is regulated to reduce the heterogeneity of the distribution of the total payoffs. It is found there is an optimal regulation strength where the fraction of cooperation is prominently promoted,…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of…
Direct reciprocity is a well-known mechanism that could explain how cooperation emerges and prevails in an evolving population. Numerous prior researches have studied the emergence of cooperation in multiplayer games. However, most of them…
Concurrent games with a fixed number of agents have been thoroughly studied, with various solution concepts and objectives for the agents. In this paper, we consider concurrent games with an arbitrary number of agents, and study the problem…
We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception introduced a bargaining solution that minimises the maximal quantified ``propensity to disrupt'' the negotiation process of the…
We introduce capital games, which generalize the definition of standard games to incorporate dynamics. In capital games, payoffs are in units of capital which are not assumed to be units of utility. The dynamics allow us to infer player…
We broaden the basis of non-cooperative game theory by considering miscoordination on a solution concept. For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where…
We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size $\theta$ is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional…
We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to…
Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…
The Shapley value (SV) and Least core (LC) are classic methods in cooperative game theory for cost/profit sharing problems. Both methods have recently been proposed as a principled solution for data valuation tasks, i.e., quantifying the…
What is the physical origin of player cooperation in minority game? And how to obtain maximum global wealth in minority game? We answer the above questions by studying a variant of minority game from which players choose among $N_c$…