Related papers: Finite-Time 4-Expert Prediction Problem

We study the classic online learning problem of predicting with expert advice, and propose a truly parameter-free and adaptive algorithm that achieves several objectives simultaneously without using any prior information. The main component…

We study the infinite horizon discrete time N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ($N \geq 2$) with stopping times as strategies (or pure strategies). We prove existence of an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium point for the game by presenting a…

Computing equilibria of games is a central task in computer science. A large number of results are known for \emph{Nash equilibrium} (NE). However, these can be adopted only when coalitions are not an issue. When instead agents can form…

Consider a scenario where a player chooses an action in each round $t$ out of $T$ rounds and observes the incurred cost after a delay of $d_{t}$ rounds. The cost functions and the delay sequence are chosen by an adversary. We show that in a…

We consider the classical problem of prediction with expert advice. In the fixed-time setting, where the time horizon is known in advance, algorithms that achieve the optimal regret are known when there are two, three, or four experts or…

The recent mean field game (MFG) formalism facilitates otherwise intractable computation of approximate Nash equilibria in many-agent settings. In this paper, we consider discrete-time finite MFGs subject to finite-horizon objectives. We…

We study the limiting behavior of the mixed strategies that result from optimal no-regret learning strategies in a repeated game setting where the stage game is any 2 by 2 competitive game. We consider optimal no-regret algorithms that are…

Designing efficient algorithms to compute Nash equilibria poses considerable challenges in Algorithmic Game Theory and Optimization. In this work, we employ integer programming techniques to compute Nash equilibria in Integer Programming…

We study a generalization of the online binary prediction with expert advice framework where at each round, the learner is allowed to pick $m\geq 1$ experts from a pool of $K$ experts and the overall utility is a modular or submodular…

In this paper we provide optimal bounds for fully discrete approximations to finite horizon problems via dynamic programming. We adapt the error analysis in \cite{nos} for the infinite horizon case to the finite horizon case. We prove an a…

Nash`s classical bargaining solution suggests that n players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player's utility functions. We consider a special case: Suppose that the…

We develop the setting of sequential prediction based on shifting experts and on a "smooth" version of the method of specialized experts. To aggregate experts predictions, we use the AdaHedge algorithm, which is a version of the Hedge…

In this paper, we propose an initial value fomulation of the discrete mean field games on finite graphs (Graph MFG), and design a neural network based approach to solve it. Graph MFG describes infinite, non-cooperative and interactive…

We resolve the long-standing "impossible tuning" issue for the classic expert problem and show that, it is in fact possible to achieve regret $O\left(\sqrt{(\ln d)\sum_t \ell_{t,i}^2}\right)$ simultaneously for all expert $i$ in a $T$-round…

We study a stochastic differential game with $N$ competitive players in a linear-quadratic framework with ergodic cost, where $d$-dimensional diffusion processes govern the state dynamics with an unknown common drift (matrix). Assuming a…

We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…

This paper considers the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in zero-sum stochastic games when expert demonstrations are known to be not optimal. Compared to previous works that decouple agents in the game by assuming optimality in…

This paper looks at solving collaborative planning problems formalized as Decentralized POMDPs (Dec-POMDPs) by searching for Nash equilibria, i.e., situations where each agent's policy is a best response to the other agents' (fixed)…

In this work, we introduce the concept of non-negative weighted regret, an extension of non-negative regret \cite{anagnostides2022last} in games. Investigating games with non-negative weighted regret helps us to understand games with…

Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…