Related papers: Finite-Time 4-Expert Prediction Problem

We consider a sequence of repeated prediction games and formally pass to the limit. The supersolutions of the resulting non-linear parabolic partial differential equation are closely related to the potential functions in the sense of…

We address the problem of sequential prediction with expert advice in a non-stationary environment with long-term memory guarantees in the sense of Bousquet and Warmuth [4]. We give a linear-time algorithm that improves on the best known…

Dynamic games provide a fundamental framework for multi-agent decision-making over time, yet computing feedback Nash equilibria (FNEs) in infinite-horizon discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) settings remains computationally challenging.…

We study the classical problem of prediction with expert advice in the adversarial setting with a geometric stopping time. In 1965, Cover gave the optimal algorithm for the case of 2 experts. In this paper, we design the optimal algorithm,…

In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…

Finite-horizon linear quadratic (LQ) games admit a unique Nash equilibrium, while infinite-horizon settings may have multiple. We clarify the relationship between these two cases by interpreting the finite-horizon equilibrium as a nonlinear…

We study the prediction with expert advice setting, where the aim is to produce a decision by combining the decisions generated by a set of experts, e.g., independently running algorithms. We achieve the min-max optimal dynamic regret under…

In this paper, we consider a distributed learning problem in a subnetwork zero-sum game, where agents are competing in different subnetworks. These agents are connected through time-varying graphs where each agent has its own cost function…

We consider dynamic games with linear dynamics and quadratic objective functions. We observe that the unconstrained open-loop Nash equilibrium coincides with a linear quadratic regulator in an augmented space, thus deriving an explicit…

In this paper we propose a numerical method to obtain an approximation of Nash equilibria for multi-player non-cooperative games with a special structure. We consider the infinite horizon problem in a case which leads to a system of…

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

We address cost identification in a finite-horizon linear quadratic Gaussian game. We characterize the set of cost parameters that generate a given Nash equilibrium policy. We propose a backpropagation algorithm to identify the time-varying…

Considering linear-quadratic discrete-time games with unknown input/output/state (i/o/s) dynamics and state, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of feedback Nash equilibria (FNE) in the…

In this work, we study potential games and Markov potential games under stochastic cost and bandit feedback. We propose a variant of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm with sufficient exploration and recursive gradient estimation, which provably…

We present novel techniques for neuro-symbolic concurrent stochastic games, a recently proposed modelling formalism to represent a set of probabilistic agents operating in a continuous-space environment using a combination of neural network…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

In this paper, we consider a differential stochastic zero-sum game in which two players intervene by adopting impulse controls in a finite time horizon. We provide a numerical solution as an approximation of the value function, which turns…

We study a variant of decision-theoretic online learning in which the set of experts that are available to Learner can shrink over time. This is a restricted version of the well-studied sleeping experts problem, itself a generalization of…

We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with linear coupling constraints affected by both local (i.e., agent-wise) and global (i.e., shared resources) disturbances taking values in polyhedral uncertainty sets. By making…

A general class of mean field games are considered where the governing dynamics are controlled diffusions in $\mathbb{R}^d$. The optimization criterion is the long time average of a running cost function. Under various sets of hypotheses,…