Related papers: Coordination Games on Weighted Directed Graphs

Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…

Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…

In this work, we introduce graphical modelsfor multi-player game theory, and give powerful algorithms for computing their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An n-player game is given by an undirected graph on n nodes and a set of n local…

In the game theory literature, there appears to be little research on equilibrium selection for normal-form games with an infinite strategy space and discontinuous utility functions. Moreover, many existing selection methods are not…

We consider a class of Nash games, termed as aggregative games, being played over a networked system. In an aggregative game, a player's objective is a function of the aggregate of all the players' decisions. Every player maintains an…

This paper considers a distributed gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in networked games on graphs. In such games a player's cost function may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. An interference graph is…

With the advance of complex large-scale networks, it is becoming increasingly important to understand how selfish and spatially distributed individuals will share network resources without centralized coordinations. In this paper, we…

The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…

This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…

We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both "local" dependencies as in graphical games, and…

Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…

In the Binary Networked Public Goods game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community. We study the problem of deciding if there exists a pure strategy Nash…

Individuals, or organizations, cooperate with or compete against one another in a wide range of practical situations. Such strategic interactions are often modeled as games played on networks, where an individual's payoff depends not only…

A key feature of wireless communications is the spatial reuse. However, the spatial aspect is not yet well understood for the purpose of designing efficient spectrum sharing mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a framework of spatial…

We consider a weighted Shapley network design game, where selfish players choose paths in a network to minimize their cost. The cost function of each edge in the network is affine linear with respect to the sum of weights of the players who…

At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper (arXiv:1307.2035v4), in contrast, the own payoff…

This paper considers a networked aggregative game (NAG) where the players are distributed over a communication network. By only communicating with a subset of players, the goal of each player in the NAG is to minimize an individual cost…