Related papers: Coordination Games on Weighted Directed Graphs
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…
This paper explores distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problems for games in which the players have limited knowledge on other players' actions. In particular, the involved players are considered to be high-order integrators with their…
We analyse the typical structure of games in terms of the connectivity properties of their best-response graphs. Our central result shows that, among games that are `generic' (without indifferences) and that have a pure Nash equilibrium,…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong…
Motivated by understanding non-strict and strict pure strategy equilibria in network anti-coordination games, we define notions of stable and, respectively, strictly stable colorings in graphs. We characterize the cases when such colorings…
The problem of the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for aggregative games has been studied over strongly connected and weight-balanced static networks and every time strongly connected and weight-balanced switching networks. In this…
This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the {\em best response policy}, which was proposed by Kearns et al. \cite{kls} as a way to represent all…
Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…
We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure Nash equilibria arising when random…
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…
We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, while deciding whether a game has a…
This paper investigates online stochastic aggregative games subject to local set constraints and time-varying coupled inequality constraints, where each player possesses a time-varying expectation-valued cost function relying on not only…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
In the field of international security, understanding the strategic interactions between countries within a networked context is crucial. Our previous research has introduced a ``games-on-signed graphs'' framework~\cite{LiMorse2022} to…
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
A distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is presented for networked games. We assume an incomplete information available to each player about the other players' actions. The players communicate over a strongly connected digraph to…
We study the computational complexity of "public goods games on networks". In this model, each vertex in a graph is an agent that needs to take a binary decision of whether to "produce a good" or not. Each agent's utility depends on the…