Related papers: Side-Channel Hardware Trojan for Provably-Secure S…
Side-channel attacks exploit variations in non-functional behaviors to expose sensitive information across security boundaries. Existing methods leverage side-channels based on power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, silicon substrate…
The gamut of todays internet-connected embedded devices has led to increased concerns regarding the security and confidentiality of data. Most internet-connected embedded devices employ mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms to…
Timely detection of Hardware Trojans (HTs) has become a major challenge for secure integrated circuits. We present a run-time methodology for HT detection that employs a multi-parameter statistical traffic modeling of the communication…
Power Side-Channel (PSC) attacks exploit power consumption patterns to extract sensitive information, posing risks to cryptographic operations crucial for secure systems. Traditional countermeasures, such as masking, face challenges…
While cryptographic algorithms such as the ubiquitous Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are secure, *physical implementations* of these algorithms in hardware inevitably 'leak' sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. A particularly…
Dynamic partial reconfiguration enables multi-tenancy in cloud-based FPGAs, which presents security challenges for tenants, IPs, and data. Malicious users can exploit FPGAs for remote side-channel attacks (SCAs), and shared on-chip…
We demonstrate that the format in which private keys are persisted impacts Side Channel Analysis (SCA) security. Surveying several widely deployed software libraries, we investigate the formats they support, how they parse these keys, and…
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in…
The globalized semiconductor supply chain has made Hardware Trojans (HT) a significant security threat to embedded systems, necessitating the design of efficient and adaptable detection mechanisms. Despite promising machine learning-based…
Logic locking has been proposed to safeguard intellectual property (IP) during chip fabrication. Logic locking techniques protect hardware IP by making a subset of combinational modules in a design dependent on a secret key that is withheld…
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) provide profitable surfaces for hardware attacks such as hardware Trojans. Hardware Trojans can implement stealthy attacks such as leaking critical information, taking control of devices or harm humans. In this…
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are well-known threats to sensitive hardware like advanced encryption standard (AES) crypto cores. Given the significant impact of supply voltages (VCCs) on power profiles, various countermeasures based on…
Many cybersecurity attacks rely on analyzing a binary executable to find exploitable sections of code. Code obfuscation is used to prevent attackers from reverse engineering these executables. In this work, we focus on control flow…
Recently, Haider et al. introduced the first rigorous hardware Trojan detection algorithm called HaTCh. The foundation of HaTCh is a formal framework of hardware Trojan design, which formally characterizes all the hardware Trojans based on…
Modern computer processors use microarchitectural optimization mechanisms to improve performance. As a downside, such optimizations are prone to introducing side-channel vulnerabilities. Speculative loading of memory, called prefetching, is…
Logic locking and hardware Trojans are two fields in hardware security that have been mostly developed independently from each other. In this paper, we identify the relationship between these two fields. We find that a common structure that…
We propose SANSCrypt, a novel sequential logic encryption scheme to protect integrated circuits against reverse engineering. Previous sequential encryption methods focus on modifying the circuit state machine such that the correct…
The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a…
Discovering new vulnerabilities and implementing security and privacy measures are important to protect systems and data against physical attacks. One such vulnerability is impedance, an inherent property of a device that can be exploited…
We systematize software side-channel attacks with a focus on vulnerabilities and countermeasures in the cryptographic implementations. Particularly, we survey past research literature to categorize vulnerable implementations, and identify…