Related papers: Side-Channel Hardware Trojan for Provably-Secure S…

Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…

Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting…

Hardware Trojans (HTs) have become a serious problem, and extermination of them is strongly required for enhancing the security and safety of integrated circuits. An effective solution is to identify HTs at the gate level via machine…

Side-channel attacks are important security challenges as they reveal sensitive information about on-chip activities. Among such attacks, the thermal side-channel has been shown to disclose the activities of key functional blocks and even…

We introduce a new class of hardware trojans called interrupt-resilient trojans (IRTs). Our work is motivated by the observation that hardware trojan attacks on CPUs, even under favorable attack scenarios (e.g., an attacker with local…

With the exponential rise in the use of cloud services, smart devices, and IoT devices, advanced cyber attacks have become increasingly sophisticated and ubiquitous. Furthermore, the rapid evolution of computing architectures and memory…

A large number of crypto accelerators are being deployed with the widespread adoption of IoT. It is vitally important that these accelerators and other security hardware IPs are provably secure. Security is an extra functional requirement…

Thermal Trojan attacks present a pressing concern for the security and reliability of System-on-Chips (SoCs), especially in mobile applications. The situation becomes more complicated when such attacks are more evasive and operate…

This paper presents a digital VLSI design flow to create secure, side-channel attack (SCA) resistant integrated circuits. The design flow starts from a normal design in a hardware description language such as VHDL or Verilog and provides a…

Detecting weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms is of utmost importance for designing secure information systems. The state-of-the-art soft analytical side-channel attack (SASCA) uses physical leakage information to make probabilistic…

This report investigates the potential impact of a Trojan attack on power conversion circuits, specifically a switching signal attack designed to trigger a locking of the pulse width modulation (PWM) signal that goes to a power field-effect…

The arm race between hardware security engineers and side-channel researchers has become more competitive with more sophisticated attacks and defenses in the last decade. While modern hardware features improve the system performance…

Over the years, many techniques have been introduced to protect integrated circuits (ICs) from hardware security threats that emerged in the globalized IC manufacturing supply chain, such as overproduction and piracy. However, most of these…

Since the inception of the Integrated Circuit (IC), the size of the transistors used to construct them has continually shrunk. While this advancement significantly improves computing capability, fabrication costs have skyrocketed. As a…

Electronic Design Automation (EDA) industry heavily reuses third party IP cores. These IP cores are vulnerable to insertion of Hardware Trojans (HTs) at design time by third party IP core providers or by malicious insiders in the design…

The hardware security community has made significant advances in detecting Hardware Trojan vulnerabilities using software fuzzing-inspired automated analysis. However, the Electronic Design Automation (EDA) code base itself remains…

Machine learning (ML) models can be trade secrets due to their development cost. Hence, they need protection against malicious forms of reverse engineering (e.g., in IP piracy). With a growing shift of ML to the edge devices, in part for…

Modern high-performance as well as power-constrained System-on-Chips (SoC) are increasingly using hardware accelerated encryption engines to secure computation, memory access, and communication operations. The electromagnetic (EM) emission…

Hardware trojan detection methods, based on machine learning (ML) techniques, mainly identify suspected circuits but lack the ability to explain how the decision was arrived at. An explainable methodology and architecture is introduced…

Side-channel attacks on memory (SCAM) exploit unintended data leaks from memory subsystems to infer sensitive information, posing significant threats to system security. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in memory access patterns, cache…