Related papers: Side-Channel Hardware Trojan for Provably-Secure S…

The availability of wide-ranging third-party intellectual property (3PIP) cores enables integrated circuit (IC) designers to focus on designing high-level features in ASICs/SoCs. The massive proliferation of ICs brings with it an increased…

System-on-chip (SoC) developers increasingly rely on pre-verified hardware intellectual property (IP) blocks acquired from untrusted third-party vendors. These IPs might contain hidden malicious functionalities or hardware Trojans to…

Always-on hardware Trojans (HTs) pose a critical risk to trusted microelectronics, yet most side-channel detection methods rely on unavailable golden references. We present a reference-free approach that combines time-frequency EM analysis…

With increasingly sophisticated cyber-adversaries able to access a wider repertoire of mechanisms to implant malware such as ransomware, CPU/GPU keyloggers, and stealthy kernel rootkits, there is an urgent need for techniques to detect and…

Cryptography is vital for data security, but cryptographic algorithms can still be vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs), physical assaults exploiting power consumption and EM radiation. SCAs pose a significant threat to cryptographic…

Side channel attacks (SCAs) remain a significant threat to the security of cryptographic systems in modern embedded devices. Even mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms, when implemented in hardware, inadvertently leak information…

This paper presents a novel defense strategy against static power side-channel attacks (PSCAs), a critical threat to cryptographic security. Our method is based on (1) carefully tuning high-Vth versus low-Vth cell selection during…

Implementation attacks like side-channel and fault attacks pose a considerable threat to cryptographic devices that are physically accessible by an attacker. As a consequence, devices like smart cards implement corresponding countermeasures…

Side-channel attacks allow extracting secret information from the execution of cryptographic primitives by correlating the partially known computed data and the measured side-channel signal. However, to set up a successful side-channel…

This work focuses on advancing security research in the hardware design space by formally defining the realistic problem of Hardware Trojan (HT) detection. The goal is to model HT detection more closely to the real world, i.e., describing…

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) launched the TrojAI program to confront an emerging vulnerability in modern artificial intelligence: the threat of AI Trojans. These AI trojans are malicious, hidden backdoors…

Split manufacturing (SM) and layout camouflaging (LC) are two promising techniques to obscure integrated circuits (ICs) from malicious entities during and after manufacturing. While both techniques enable protecting the intellectual…

The transient execution attack is a type of attack leveraging the vulnerability of modern CPU optimization technologies. New attacks surface rapidly. The side-channel is a key part of transient execution attacks to leak data. In this work,…

Internet of Things connects lots of small constrained devices to the Internet. As in any other environment, communication security is important and cryptographic algorithms are one of many elements that we use in order to keep messages…

Consumer and defense systems demanded design and manufacturing of electronics with increased performance, compared to their predecessors. As such systems became ubiquitous in a plethora of domains, their application surface increased, thus…

Cryptographic computations are fundamental to modern computing, ensuring data confidentiality and integrity. However, these operations are highly vulnerable to power side-channel attacks that exploit variations in power consumption to leak…

The reliability of the outcome of a quantum circuit in near-term noisy quantum computers depends on the gate count and depth for a given problem. Circuits with a short depth and lower gate count can yield the correct solution more often…

Recently, it has been shown that deep learning models are vulnerable to Trojan attacks, where an attacker can install a backdoor during training time to make the resultant model misidentify samples contaminated with a small trigger patch.…

Supervised deep learning has emerged as an effective tool for carrying out power side-channel attacks on cryptographic implementations. While increasingly-powerful deep learning-based attacks are regularly published, comparatively-little…

Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke timings and subsequently infer typed words and sentences.…