We demonstrate that the format in which private keys are persisted impacts Side Channel Analysis (SCA) security. Surveying several widely deployed software libraries, we investigate the formats they support, how they parse these keys, and what runtime decisions they make. We uncover a combination of weaknesses and vulnerabilities, in extreme cases inducing completely disjoint multi-precision arithmetic stacks deep within the cryptosystem level for keys that otherwise seem logically equivalent. Exploiting these vulnerabilities, we design and implement key recovery attacks utilizing signals ranging from electromagnetic (EM) emanations, to granular microarchitecture cache timings, to coarse traditional wall clock timings.
@article{arxiv.1909.01785,
title = {Certified Side Channels},
author = {Cesar Pereida García and Sohaib ul Hassan and Nicola Tuveri and Iaroslav Gridin and Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.01785},
year = {2020}
}