Related papers: Output-sensitive Information flow analysis
Simply restricting the computation to non-sensitive part of the data may lead to inferences on sensitive data through data dependencies. Inference control from data dependencies has been studied in the prior work. However, existing…
Formal verification of software and compilers has been used to rule out large classes of security-critical issues, but risk of unintentional information leakage has received much less consideration. It is a key requirement for formal…
Cryptographic research takes software timing side channels seriously. Approaches to mitigate them include constant-time coding and techniques to enforce such practices. However, recent attacks like Meltdown [42], Spectre [37], and…
We propose an operational measure of information leakage in a non-stochastic setting to formalize privacy against a brute-force guessing adversary. We use uncertain variables, non-probabilistic counterparts of random variables, to construct…
The paper studies dynamic information flow security policies in an automaton-based model. Two semantic interpretations of such policies are developed, both of which generalize the notion of TA-security [van der Meyden ESORICS 2007] for…
In automated complexity analysis, noninterference-based type systems statically guarantee, via soundness, the property that well-typed programs compute functions of a given complexity class, e.g., the class FP of functions computable in…
We consider the problem of specifying and proving the security of non-trivial, concurrent programs that intentionally leak information. We present a method that decomposes the problem into (a) proving that the program only leaks information…
Information flow security ensures that the secret data manipulated by a program does not influence its observable output. Proving information flow security is especially challenging for concurrent programs, where operations on secret data…
Quantitative theories of information flow give us an approach to relax the absolute confidentiality properties that are difficult to satisfy for many practical programs. The classical information-theoretic approaches for sequential…
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of…
This work provides a framework for nonlinear model-free control of systems with unknown input-output dynamics, but outputs that can be controlled by the inputs. This framework leads to real-time control of the system such that a feasible…
Large Language Models for Code (LLMs4Code) have achieved strong performance in code generation, but recent studies reveal that they may memorize and leak sensitive information contained in training data, posing serious privacy risks. To…
Fine grained information flow monitoring can in principle address a wide range of security and privacy goals, for example in web applications. But it is very difficult to achieve sound monitoring with acceptable runtime cost and sufficient…
We present a novel formal system for proving quantitative-leakage properties of programs. Based on a theory of Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) that models information leakage as a noisy communication channel, it uses "gain-functions"…
Information flow analysis prevents secret or untrusted data from flowing into public or trusted sinks. Existing mechanisms cover a wide array of options, ranging from lightweight taint analysis to heavyweight information flow control that…
Noninterference provides a control over information flow in a system for ensuring confidentiality and integrity properties. In the literature this notion has been well studied as transitive noninterference and intransitive noninterference.…
Detection and quantification of information leaks through timing side channels are important to guarantee confidentiality. Although static analysis remains the prevalent approach for detecting timing side channels, it is computationally…
This paper studies the problem of reasoning about flow security properties in virtualised computing networks with mobility from perspective of formal language. We propose a distributed process algebra CSP_{4v} with security labelled…
Timing side-channel attacks exploit secret-dependent execution time to fully or partially recover secrets of cryptographic implementations, posing a severe threat to software security. Constant-time programming discipline is an effective…
We introduce a new perspective into the field of quantitative information flow (QIF) analysis that invites the community to bound the leakage, reported by QIF quantifiers, by a range consistent with the size of a program's secret input…