Quantifying Timing Leaks and Cost Optimisation
Cryptography and Security
2008-07-25 v1 Programming Languages
Abstract
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of a program with respect to this notion via a computable estimate of the timing leakage and use this estimate for cost optimisation.
Cite
@article{arxiv.0807.3879,
title = {Quantifying Timing Leaks and Cost Optimisation},
author = {Alessandra Di Pierro and Chris Hankin and Herbert Wiklicky},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0807.3879},
year = {2008}
}
Comments
16 pages, 2 figures, 4 tables. A shorter version is included in the proceedings of ICICS'08 - 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, 20-22 October, 2008 Birmingham, UK