Related papers: Output-sensitive Information flow analysis

An oblivious computation is one that is free of direct and indirect information leaks, e.g., due to observable differences in timing and memory access patterns. This paper presents Lambda Obliv, a core language whose type system enforces…

Synchronous reactive data flow is a paradigm that provides a high-level abstract programming model for embedded and cyber-physical systems, including the locally synchronous components of IoT systems. Security in such systems is severely…

We propose a constraint-based flow-sensitive static analysis for concurrent programs by iteratively composing thread-modular abstract interpreters via the use of a system of lightweight constraints. Our method is compositional in that it…

We propose a type system to analyze the time consumed by multi-threaded imperative programs with a shared global memory, which delineates a class of safe multi-threaded programs. We demonstrate that a safe multi-threaded program runs in…

We present a deductive approach for the analysis of secure information flows with support for fine-grained policies that include declassifications in the form of delimited information release. By explicitly tracking the dependencies of…

Information flow control type systems statically restrict the propagation of sensitive data to ensure end-to-end confidentiality. The property to be shown is noninterference, asserting that an attacker cannot infer any secrets from made…

Static information flow control (IFC) systems provide the ability to restrict data flows within a program, enabling vulnerable functionality or confidential data to be statically isolated from unsecured data or program logic. Despite the…

Information flow analysis checks whether certain pieces of (confidential) data may affect the results of computations in unwanted ways and thus leak information. Dynamic information flow analysis adds instrumentation code to the target…

Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) is one of the most widely used recurrent structures in sequence modeling. It aims to use gates to control information flow (e.g., whether to skip some information or not) in the recurrent computations, although…

Quantitative information flow analyses measure how much information on secrets is leaked by publicly observable outputs. One area of interest is to quantify and estimate the information leakage of composed systems. Prior work has focused on…

We introduce a privacy measure called pointwise maximal leakage, generalizing the pre-existing notion of maximal leakage, which quantifies the amount of information leaking about a secret $X$ by disclosing a single outcome of a (randomized)…

We propose an approach on model checking information flow for imperative language with procedures. We characterize our model with pushdown system, which has a stack of unbounded length that naturally models the execution of procedural…

The PQDSS standardization process requires cryptographic primitives to be free from vulnerabilities, including timing and cache side-channels. Resistance to timing leakage is therefore an essential property, and achieving this typically…

Quantitative information flow (QIF) is traditionally defined as the expected value of information leakage over all feasible program runs and it fails to identify vulnerable programs where only limited number of runs leak large amount of…

This paper discusses stability and robustness properties of a recently proposed observer algorithm for linear time varying systems. The observer is based on the approximation and subsequent modification of the non-negative Lyapunov…

Data minimisation is a privacy enhancing principle, stating that personal data collected should be no more than necessary for the specific purpose consented by the user. Checking that a program satisfies the data minimisation principle is…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly becoming commodity components of larger software systems. This poses natural security and privacy problems: poisoned data retrieved from one component can change the model's behavior and compromise…

We consider CCS with value passing and elaborate a notion of noninterference for the process calculi, which matches closely that of the programming language. The idea is to view channels as information carriers rather than as "events", so…

It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But doing so leaves a gap between reasoning and reality that can only be filled by accounting for the behaviour of the compiler. This task is…

Non-interference is a program property that ensures the absence of information leaks. In the context of programming languages, there exist two common approaches for establishing non-interference: type systems and program logics. Type…