Related papers: Output-sensitive Information flow analysis

We propose a novel type system for verifying that programs correctly implement constant-resource behavior. Our type system extends recent work on automatic amortized resource analysis (AARA), a set of techniques that automatically derive…

The importance of preventing microarchitectural timing side channels in security-critical applications has surged in recent years. Constant-time programming has emerged as a best-practice technique for preventing the leakage of secret…

Elaborate protocols in Secure Multi-party Computation enable several participants to compute a public function of their own private inputs while ensuring that no undesired information leaks about the private inputs, and without resorting to…

Information-flow control mechanisms are difficult both to design and to prove correct. To reduce the time wasted on doomed proof attempts due to broken definitions, we advocate modern random testing techniques for finding counterexamples…

Information leakage to a guessing adversary in index coding is studied, where some messages in the system are sensitive and others are not. The non-sensitive messages can be used by the server like secret keys to mitigate leakage of the…

Security policies are naturally dynamic. Reflecting this, there has been a growing interest in studying information-flow properties which change during program execution, including concepts such as declassification, revocation, and…

Programmers of cryptographic applications written in C need to avoid common mistakes such as sending private data over public channels, modifying trusted data with untrusted functions, or improperly ordering protocol steps. These secrecy,…

We propose a new sheaf semantics for secure information flow over a space of abstract behaviors, based on synthetic domain theory: security classes are open/closed partitions, types are sheaves, and redaction of sensitive information…

Proving only over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data leaves a gap between reasoning and reality that can only be filled by accounting for the behaviour of the compiler. Furthermore, software does not always have the luxury…

Quantitative information flow (QIF) is concerned with assessing the leakage of information in computational systems. In QIF there are two main perspectives for the quantification of leakage. On one hand, the static perspective considers all…

This paper is concerned with the stability analysis of encrypted observer-based control for linear continuous-time systems. Since conventional encryption has limited ability to deploy in continuous-time integral computation, our work…

SAFE is a clean-slate design for a highly secure computer system, with pervasive mechanisms for tracking and limiting information flows. At the lowest level, the SAFE hardware supports fine-grained programmable tags, with efficient and…

The timing characteristics of cache, a high-speed storage between the fast CPU and the slowmemory, may reveal sensitive information of a program, thus allowing an adversary to conduct side-channel attacks. Existing methods for detecting…

Timing side-channel attacks exploit variations in program execution time to recover sensitive information. Cryptographic implementations are especially vulnerable to these attacks, since even small timing differences in operations such as…

Probing signal injection is a well-established technique to extract additional information from a weakly (or non) observable dynamical system. Using averaging theory, a framework to analyse such schemes for general nonlinear systems has…

The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic…

Observational determinism is a security property that characterizes secure information flow for multithreaded programs. Most of the methods that have been used to verify observational determinism are based on either type systems or…

Security of information flow is commonly understood as preventing any information leakage, regardless of how grave or harmless consequences the leakage can have. In this work, we suggest that information security is not a goal in itself,…

Modern stream-based monitors collect detailed statistics of the runtime behavior of the system under observation. If the system runs in a privacy-sensitive context, this poses the risk of disclosing sensitive information. Differential…

We present an instrumenting compiler for enforcing data confidentiality in low-level applications (e.g. those written in C) in the presence of an active adversary. In our approach, the programmer marks secret data by writing lightweight…