Related papers: Controlling a Random Population is EXPTIME-hard

We study stochastic zero-sum games on graphs, which are prevalent tools to model decision-making in presence of an antagonistic opponent in a random environment. In this setting, an important question is the one of strategy complexity: what…

We consider the problem of computing the maximal probability of satisfying an omega-regular specification for stochastic nonlinear systems evolving in discrete time. The problem reduces, after automata-theoretic constructions, to finding…

Two-player games on graphs are widely studied in formal methods as they model the interaction between a system and its environment. The game is played by moving a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path. There are several…

We consider a multi-player non-zero-sum turn-based game (abbreviated as multi-player game) on a finite directed graph. A secure equilibrium (SE) is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy because…

We study two-player reachability games on finite graphs. At each state the interaction between the players is concurrent and there is a stochastic Nature. Players also play stochastically. The literature tells us that 1) Player B, who wants…

Active context-free games are two-player games on strings over finite alphabets with one player trying to rewrite the input string to match a target specification. These games have been investigated in the context of exchanging Active XML…

We note that the remarkable EXPSPACE-hardness result in [G\"oller, Haase, Ouaknine, Worrell, ICALP 2010] ([GHOW10] for short) allows us to answer an open complexity question for simulation preorder of succinct one counter nets (i.e., one…

In this paper we introduce polytopal stochastic games, an extension of two-player, zero-sum, turn-based stochastic games, in which we may have uncertainty over the transition probabilities. In these games the uncertainty over the…

Mertens [In Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians (Berkeley, Calif., 1986) (1987) 1528-1577 Amer. Math. Soc.] proposed two general conjectures about repeated games: the first one is that, in any two-person zero-sum…

Traditionally quantitative games such as mean-payoff games and discount sum games have two players -- one trying to maximize the payoff, the other trying to minimize it. The associated decision problem, "Can Eve (the maximizer) achieve, for…

We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…

In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…

Partially-Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are a well-known stochastic model for sequential decision making under limited information. We consider the EXPTIME-hard problem of synthesising policies that almost-surely reach some…

We give an algorithm for solving stochastic parity games with almost-sure winning conditions on lossy channel systems, for the case where the players are restricted to finite-memory strategies. First, we describe a general framework, where…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…

A two-person zero-sum infinite dimensional differential game of infinite duration with discounted payoff involving hybrid controls is studied. The minimizing player is allowed to take continuous, switching and impulse controls whereas the…

In a zero-sum stochastic game with signals, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by these decisions and a variable called state. The state follows a Markov chain, that is controlled by…

We present two zero-sum games modeling situations where one player attacks (or hides in) a finite dimensional nonempty compact set, and the other tries to prevent the attack (or find him). The first game, called patrolling game, corresponds…

We consider the manipulability of tournament rules which map the results of $\binom{n}{2}$ pairwise matches and select a winner. Prior work designs simple tournament rules such that no pair of teams can manipulate the outcome of their match…