Related papers: Distance Restricted Manipulation in Voting

Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting…

In the well-studied metric distortion problem in social choice, we have voters and candidates located in a shared metric space, and the objective is to design a voting rule that selects a candidate with minimal total distance to the voters.…

Motivated by the success of bounded model checking framework for finite state machines, Ouaknine and Worrell proposed a time-bounded theory of real-time verification by claiming that restriction to bounded-time recovers decidability for…

We consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under Impartial Culture voter behaviour. We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of voters that must be…

In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…

We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small…

In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…

We focus on the following natural question: is it possible to influence the outcome of a voting process through the strategic provision of information to voters who update their beliefs rationally? We investigate whether it is…

We propose a framework for strategic voting when a voter may lack knowledge about the preferences of other voters, or about other voters' knowledge about her own preference. In this setting we define notions of manipulation, equilibrium,…

In this paper, we study voting rules on the interval domain, where the alternatives are arranged according to an externally given strict total order and voters report intervals of this order to indicate the alternatives they support. For…

We propose a simple method for combining together voting rules that performs a run-off between the different winners of each voting rule. We prove that this combinator has several good properties. For instance, even if just one of the base…

We develop a control algorithm that ensures the safety, in terms of confinement in a set, of a system with unknown, 2nd-order nonlinear dynamics. The algorithm establishes novel connections between data-driven and robust, nonlinear control.…

We consider the problem of protecting and manipulating elections by recounting and changing ballots, respectively. Our setting involves a plurality-based election held across multiple districts, and the problem formulations are based on the…

We study the performance of voting mechanisms from a utilitarian standpoint, under the recently introduced framework of metric-distortion, offering new insights along three main lines. First, if $d$ represents the doubling dimension of the…

An important question in elections is the determine whether a candidate can be a winner when some votes are absent. We study this determining winner with the absent votes (WAV) problem when the votes are top-truncated. We show that the WAV…

We introduce and study isomorphic distances between ordinal elections (with the same numbers of candidates and voters). The main feature of these distances is that they are invariant to renaming the candidates and voters, and two elections…

In many high-dimensional problems,polynomial-time algorithms fall short of achieving the statistical limits attainable without computational constraints. A powerful approach to probe the limits of polynomial-time algorithms is to study the…

In many practical scenarios, a population is divided into disjoint groups for better administration, e.g., electorates into political districts, employees into departments, students into school districts, and so on. However, grouping people…

To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings,…

A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control,…