Related papers: Distance Restricted Manipulation in Voting
We consider multiwinner elections in Euclidean space using the minimax Chamberlin-Courant rule. In this setting, voters and candidates are embedded in a $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and the goal is to choose a committee of $k$…
We consider spatial voting where candidates are located in the Euclidean $d$-dimensional space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their distance from the voter's ideal point. We explore the case where information about the location…
We consider the distributed single-winner metric voting problem on a line, where agents and alternative are represented by points on the line of real numbers, the agents are partitioned into disjoint districts, and the goal is to choose a…
The resilience of a voting system has been a central topic in computational social choice. Many voting rules, like plurality, are shown to be vulnerable as the attacker can target specific voters to manipulate the result. What if a local…
Studying the computational complexity and designing fast algorithms for determining winners under voting rules are classical and fundamental questions in computational social choice. In this paper, we accelerate voting by leveraging quantum…
Distortion-based analysis has established itself as a fruitful framework for comparing voting mechanisms. m voters and n candidates are jointly embedded in an (unknown) metric space, and the voters submit rankings of candidates by…
The Skating System, which originated from the scrutineering system in dance sport tournaments, can be formulated as a voting system: We introduce and formalize the Skating System Single (SkS, for short), a new voting system embedded into…
Voter control problems model situations in which an external agent tries toaffect the result of an election by adding or deleting the fewest number of voters. The goal of the agent is to make a specific candidate either win…
Constructive election control considers the problem of an adversary who seeks to sway the outcome of an electoral process in order to ensure that their favored candidate wins. We consider the computational problem of constructive election…
We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters are embedded in a common metric space, and cardinal preferences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. In a positional voting rule, each candidate receives a score…
We consider the problem of rank aggregation based on new distance measures derived through axiomatic approaches and based on score-based methods. In the first scenario, we derive novel distance measures that allow for discriminating between…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by…
Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…
We present an almost optimal algorithm for the classic Chamberlin-Courant multiwinner voting rule (CC) on single-peaked preference profiles. Given $n$ voters and $m$ candidates, it runs in almost linear time in the input size, improving the…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an optimal committee of size $k$ under any given Thiele voting rule for elections on the Voter Interval domain (i.e., when voters can be ordered so that each candidate is approved by a…
Bribery in election (or computational social choice in general) is an important problem that has received a considerable amount of attention. In the classic bribery problem, the briber (or attacker) bribes some voters in attempting to make…
Gerrymandering is a practice of manipulating district boundaries and locations in order to achieve a political advantage for a particular party. Lewenberg, Lev, and Rosenschein [AAMAS 2017] initiated the algorithmic study of a…
Consider the following social choice problem. Suppose we have a set of $n$ voters and $m$ candidates that lie in a metric space. The goal is to design a mechanism to choose a candidate whose average distance to the voters is as small as…
We focus on the scenario in which an agent can exploit his information advantage to manipulate the outcome of an election. In particular, we study district-based elections with two candidates, in which the winner of the election is the…