Related papers: Stable Noncrossing Matchings
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
This paper has two objectives. One is to give a linear time algorithm that solves the stable roommates problem (i.e., obtains one stable matching) using the stable marriage problem. The idea is that a stable matching of a roommate instance…
Let $G$ be a graph and suppose we are given, for each $v \in V(G)$, a strict ordering of the neighbors of $v$. A set of matchings ${\cal M}$ of $G$ is called internally stable if there are no matchings $M,M' \in {\cal M}$ such that an edge…
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
This paper develops a method to use singles' data in a non-parametric revealed preference setting of collective household choice. We use it to test the controversial assumption of preference stability between singles and couples, without…
Two-sided popular matchings in bipartite graphs are a well-known generalization of stable matchings in the marriage setting, and they are especially relevant when preference lists are incomplete. In this case, the cardinality of a stable…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
We consider the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences, a problem originally proposed by Knuth. Despite extensive study of the problem by experts from different areas, the question of whether every instance of…
For a two-sided ($n$ men/$n$ women) stable matching problem) Gale and Shapley studied a proposal algorithm (men propose/women select, or the other way around), that determines a matching, not blocked by any unmatched pair. Irving used this…
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…
An algorithm is demonstrated that finds an ordinary intersection in an arrangement of $n$ lines in $\mathbb{R}^2$, not all parallel and not all passing through a common point, in time $O(n \log{n})$. The algorithm is then extended to find…
We study noncrossing geometric graphs and their disjoint compatible geometric matchings. Given a cycle (a polygon) P we want to draw a set of pairwise disjoint straight-line edges with endpoints on the vertices of P such that these new…
Given n red and n blue points in general position in the plane, it is well-known that there is a perfect matching formed by non-crossing line segments. We characterize the bichromatic point sets which admit exactly one non-crossing…
The popular matching problem is of matching a set of applicants to a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list, ranking a non-empty subset of posts in the order of preference, possibly with ties. A matching M is popular if…
The paper discusses a statistical problem related to testing for differences between two sparse networks with community structures. The community-wise edge probability matrices have entries of order $O(n^{-1}/\log n)$, where $n$ represents…
The theory of optimal choice sets is a solution theory that has a long and well-established tradition in social choice and game theories. Some of important general solution concepts of choice problems when the set of best alternatives does…