Related papers: Stable Noncrossing Matchings
We show that given a SM instance G as input we can find a largest collection of pairwise edge-disjoint stable matchings of G in time linear in the input size. This extends two classical results: 1. The Gale-Shapley algorithm, which can find…
I study a two-sided marriage market in which agents have incomplete preferences -- i.e., they find some alternatives incomparable. The strong (weak) core consists of matchings wherein no coalition wants to form a new match between…
Biased sampling and missing data complicates statistical problems ranging from causal inference to reinforcement learning. We often correct for biased sampling of summary statistics with matching methods and importance weighting. In this…
A matching is a set of edges in a graph with no common endpoint. A matching M is called acyclic if the induced subgraph on the endpoints of the edges in M is acyclic. Given a graph G and an integer k, Acyclic Matching Problem seeks for an…
We study the parameterized complexity of dominating sets in geometric intersection graphs. In one dimension, we investigate intersection graphs induced by translates of a fixed pattern Q that consists of a finite number of intervals and a…
We investigate the following many-to-one stable matching problem with diversity constraints (SMTI-Diverse): Given a set of students and a set of colleges which have preferences over each other, where the students have overlapping types, and…
We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…
Community detection, discovering the underlying communities within a network from observed connections, is a fundamental problem in network analysis, yet it remains underexplored for signed networks. In signed networks, both edge connection…
Our input is a complete graph $G = (V,E)$ on $n$ vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in $G$. Our goal is to construct a matching in $G$ that is popular. A matching $M$ is popular if $M$ does not lose a…
The second author has introduced non-crossing tableaux, objects whose non-nesting analogues are semi-standard Young tableaux. We relate non-crossing tableaux to Gelfand-Tsetlin patterns and develop the non-crossing analogue of standard…
A matching $M$ is a $\mathscr{P}$-matching if the subgraph induced by the endpoints of the edges of $M$ satisfies property $\mathscr{P}$. As examples, for appropriate choices of $\mathscr{P}$, the problems Induced Matching, Uniquely…
The stable roommates problem is a non-bipartite version of the well-known stable matching problem. Teo and Sethuraman proved that, for each instance of the stable roommates problem in a complete graph, there exists a linear inequality…
Given a bipartite graph G = (A u B, E) with strict preference lists and and edge e*, we ask if there exists a popular matching in G that contains the edge e*. We call this the popular edge problem. A matching M is popular if there is no…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$ where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every $a \in A$ ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference lists of $b \in B$…
In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an…
This paper investigates two issues on identification of switched linear systems: persistence of excitation and numerical algorithms. The main contribution is a much weaker condition on the regressor to be persistently exciting that…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
Empirical modelling often aims for the simplest model consistent with the data. A new technique is presented which quantifies the consistency of the model dynamics as a function of location in state space. As is well-known, traditional…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…