Related papers: Sequential games and nondeterministic selection fu…

Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of full observation. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several sub-classes of mean-payoff games…

Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic, such that the dynamics becomes deterministic…

This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as $\omega$-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which…

Recent extensions to dynamic games of the well-known fictitious play learning procedure in static games were proved to globally converge to stationary Nash equilibria in two important classes of dynamic games (zero-sum and…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we…

Determining a Nash equilibrium in a $2$-player non-zero sum game is known to be PPAD-hard (Chen and Deng (2006), Chen, Deng and Teng (2009)). The problem, even when restricted to win-lose bimatrix games, remains PPAD-hard (Abbott, Kane and…

We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…

Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…

In this paper we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are defined by a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence…

This work lies in the fusion of experimental economics and data mining. It continues author's previous work on mining behaviour rules of human subjects from experimental data, where game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work.…

We consider a scheduling game on parallel related machines, in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to…

We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of…

We extend the study of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) from Nash strategic games to a class of qualitative games. Also in this case, the IESDS process leads us to a kind of 'rationalizable' result. We…

Compositional Game Theory is a new, recently introduced model of economic games based upon the computer science idea of compositionality. In it, complex and irregular games can be built up from smaller and simpler games, and the equilibria…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…

We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…

The paper is concerned with a zero-sum continuous-time stochastic differential game with a dynamics controlled by a Markov process and a terminal payoff. The value function of the original game is estimated using the value function of a…

In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…

We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian…