The reduction of qualitative games
Computer Science and Game Theory
2013-03-29 v1 Optimization and Control
Abstract
We extend the study of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) from Nash strategic games to a class of qualitative games. Also in this case, the IESDS process leads us to a kind of 'rationalizable' result. We define several types of dominance relation and game reduction and establish conditions under which a unique and nonempty maximal reduction exists. We generalize, in this way, some results due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) and Apt (2007).
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Cite
@article{arxiv.1303.6976,
title = {The reduction of qualitative games},
author = {Monica Patriche},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1303.6976},
year = {2013}
}
Comments
21 pages