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We consider a multi-agent system in which a decentralized team of agents controls a stochastic system in the presence of an adversary. Instead of committing to a fixed information sharing protocol, the agents can strategically decide at…
This paper establishes a connection between the notion of observation (or monitoring) structure in game theory and the one of communication channels in Shannon theory. One of the objectives is to know under which conditions an arbitrary…
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…
We study a cheap-talk game where two experts first choose what information to acquire and then offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that…
Emergent language research has made significant progress in recent years, but still largely fails to explore how communication emerges in more complex and situated multi-agent systems. Existing setups often employ a reference game, which…
We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other…
Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient…
When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a…
Time is a crucial factor in modelling dynamic behaviours of intelligent agents: activities have a determined temporal duration in a real-world environment, and previous actions influence agents' behaviour. In this paper, we propose a…
In a cooperative multiagent system, a collection of agents executes a joint policy in order to achieve some common objective. The successful deployment of such systems hinges on the availability of reliable inter-agent communication.…
In this paper, we study which data can be induced by a correlated equilibrium given a known finite simultaneous move game. We assume that an analyst has access to the frequency of each agent's actions but does not have access to the…
We develop the linear programming approach to mean-field games in a general setting. This relaxed control approach allows to prove existence results under weak assumptions, and lends itself well to numerical implementation. We consider…
LLMs are used predominantly in synchronous communication, where a human user and a model communicate in alternating turns. In contrast, many real-world settings are asynchronous. For example, in group chats, online team meetings, or social…
Network games study the strategic interaction of agents connected through a network. Interventions in such a game -- actions a coordinator or planner may take that change the utility of the agents and thus shift the equilibrium action…
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced in arXiv:1307.2145, arXiv:1403.4958. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
The majority of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) literature equates the cooperation of self-interested agents in mixed environments to the problem of social welfare maximization, allowing agents to arbitrarily share rewards and…
Under non-exponential discounting, we develop a dynamic theory for stopping problems in continuous time. Our framework covers discount functions that induce decreasing impatience. Due to the inherent time inconsistency, we look for…
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced by J. Desel and J. Esparza. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of…