Negotiation Games
Abstract
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced by J. Desel and J. Esparza. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of agents force that a negotiation terminates (resp. block the negotiation so that it goes on forever)?; can the coalition force a given outcome of the negotiation? We show that for arbitrary negotiations the problems are EXPTIME-complete. Then we show that for sound and deterministic or even weakly deterministic negotiations the problems can be solved in PTIME. Notice that the input of the problems is a negotiation, which can be exponentially more compact than its state space.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1509.07199,
title = {Negotiation Games},
author = {Philipp Hoffmann},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1509.07199},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
In Proceedings GandALF 2015, arXiv:1509.06858. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1405.6820