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We introduce a formalism modelling communication of distributed agents strictly in continuous-time. Within this framework, we study the problem of synthesising local strategies for individual agents such that a specified set of goal states…

How important are leaders' actions in facilitating coordination? In this paper, we investigate their signaling role in a global games framework. A perfectly informed leader and a team of followers face a coordination problem. Despite the…

We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…

Mean-field games have been studied under the assumption of very large number of players. For such large systems, the basic idea consists to approximate large games by a stylized game model with a continuum of players. The approach has been…

We propose a finite automaton-style solution concept for supergames. In our model, we define an equilibrium to be a cycle of state switches and a supergame to be an infinite walk on states of a finite stage game. We show that if the stage…

In this paper, we delve into the problem of using monetary incentives to encourage players to shift from an initial Nash equilibrium to a more favorable one within a game. Our main focus revolves around computing the minimum reward required…

Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…

Mathematical models of interactions among rational agents have long been studied in game theory. However these interactions are often over a small set of discrete game actions which is very different from how humans communicate in natural…

In this article, an agent-based negotiation model for negotiation teams that negotiate a deal with an opponent is presented. Agent-based negotiation teams are groups of agents that join together as a single negotiation party because they…

Consider a small group of mobile agents whose goal is to locate a certain cell in a two-dimensional infinite grid. The agents operate in an asynchronous environment, where in each discrete time step, an arbitrary subset of the agents…

In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number $N$ of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish…

We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…

We study $N$-player optimal execution games in an Obizhaeva--Wang model of transient price impact. When the game is regularized by an instantaneous cost on the trading rate, a unique equilibrium exists and we derive its closed form. Whereas…

Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…

Communicating in natural language is a powerful tool in multi-agent settings, as it enables independent agents to share information in partially observable settings and allows zero-shot coordination with humans. However, most prior works…

We provide a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium. For any finite game, we study how players coordinate their play on a signal by means of a public strategy whose instructions are expressed in some natural language. Language can…

Distributed decision making in multi-agent networks has recently attracted significant research attention thanks to its wide applicability, e.g. in the management and optimization of computer networks, power systems, robotic teams, sensor…

In repeated games, such as auctions, players rely on autonomous learning agents to choose their actions. We study settings in which players have their agents make monetary transfers to other agents during play at their own expense, in order…

The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…

We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game.…