Related papers: Implementing Mediators with Asynchronous Cheap Tal…
Negotiations, introduced by Esparza et al., are a model for concurrent systems where computations involving a set of agents are described in terms of their interactions. In many situations, it is natural to impose timing constraints between…
We simulate behaviour of two independent reinforcement learning algorithms playing the Crawford and Sobel (1982) game of strategic information transmission. We adopt memoryless algorithms to capture learning in a static game where a large…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
Safe, agile, and socially compliant multi-robot navigation in cluttered and constrained environments remains a critical challenge. This is especially difficult with self-interested agents with unique, unknown priorities in decentralized…
To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the…
This paper investigates the role of mediators in Bayesian games by examining their impact on social welfare through the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS). Mediators can communicate with players to guide them toward…
When communicating, people behave consistently across conversational roles: People understand the words they say and are able to produce the words they hear. To date, artificial agents developed for language tasks have lacked such symmetry,…
In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominating player and a group of representative agents, each of which acts similarly and also interacts with each other through a mean field term being substantially influenced by the…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
Cooperative bargaining games are widely used to model resource allocation and conflict resolution. Traditional solutions assume the mediator can access agents utility function values and gradients. However, there is an increasing number of…
We study a multi-player stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium…
There is currently an intersection in the research of game theory and cryptography. Generally speaking, there are two aspects to this partnership. First there is the application of game theory to cryptography. Yet, the purpose of this paper…
Multi-agent networked linear dynamic systems have attracted attention of researchers in power systems, intelligent transportation, and industrial automation. The agents might cooperatively optimize a global performance objective, resulting…
Stackelberg games and their resulting equilibria have received increasing attention in the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature. Each stage of a traditional Stackelberg game involves a leader(s) acting first, followed by the…
Delay is the norm in bargaining. I propose a novel source of bargaining delay: absentmindedness. Instead of interpreting absentmindedness as a literal memory friction, I use absentmindedness to represent a broader form of bounded…
So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…
We study a multiagent learning problem where agents can either learn via repeated interactions, or can follow the advice of a mediator who suggests possible actions to take. We present an algorithmthat each agent can use so that, with high…
In this paper, we study asynchronous consensus problems of continuous-time multi-agent systems with discontinuous information transmission. The proposed consensus control strategy is implemented only based on the state information at some…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…