Related papers: Implementing Mediators with Asynchronous Cheap Tal…

In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the mediator, who recommends an action to the receiver based on the…

In recent years, agents have become capable of communicating seamlessly via natural language and navigating in environments that involve cooperation and competition, a fact that can introduce social dilemmas. Due to the interleaving of…

It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have…

A mediator is a mechanism that can only suggest actions to players, as a function of all agents' reported types, in a given game of incomplete information. We study what is achievable by two kinds of mediators, "strong" and "weak." Players…

This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph.…

Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the…

Many real-world scenarios involve teams of agents that have to coordinate their actions to reach a shared goal. We focus on the setting in which a team of agents faces an opponent in a zero-sum, imperfect-information game. Team members can…

We initiate the study of Bayesian conversations, which model interactive communication between two strategic agents without a mediator. We compare this to communication through a mediator and investigate the settings in which a mediation…

In this work we apply methods from cryptography to enable any number of mutually distrusting players to implement broad classes of mediated equilibria of strategic games without the need for trusted mediation. Our implementation makes use…

Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the…

We consider a sender-receiver game in which the receiver's action is binary and the sender's preferences are state-independent. The state is multidimensional. The receiver can select one dimension of the state to check (i.e., observe)…

Perfect synchronicity in $N$-player games is a useful theoretical dream, but communication delays are inevitable and may result in asynchronous interactions. Some systems such as financial markets are asynchronous by design, and yet most…

This paper investigates the discrete-time asynchronous games in which noncooperative agents seek to minimize their individual cost functions. Building on the assumption of partial asynchronism, i.e., each agent updates at least once within…

This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…

Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…

Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…

We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores…

A correlated equilibrium is a fundamental solution concept in game theory that enjoys many desirable properties. However, it requires a trusted mediator, which is a major drawback in many practical applications. A computational solution to…

This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…

We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…