Related papers: Cumulative subtraction games
At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper (arXiv:1307.2035v4), in contrast, the own payoff…
In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…
Several problems in planning and reactive synthesis can be reduced to the analysis of two-player quantitative graph games. {\em Optimization} is one form of analysis. We argue that in many cases it may be better to replace the optimization…
We present two zero-sum games modeling situations where one player attacks (or hides in) a finite dimensional nonempty compact set, and the other tries to prevent the attack (or find him). The first game, called patrolling game, corresponds…
Given two finite sets of integers $S\subseteq\NNN\setminus\{0\}$ and $D\subseteq\NNN\setminus\{0,1\}$,the impartial combinatorial game $\IMARK(S,D)$ is played on a heap of tokens. From a heap of $n$ tokens, each player can moveeither to a…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…
This paper studies sequential quantum games under the assumption that the moves of the players are drawn from groups and not just plain sets. The extra group structure makes possible to easily derive some very general results characterizing…
We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD). We assume that players make their choices knowing only average payoffs from the previous stages. A player's strategy is a function from the convex hull $\mathfrak{S}$ of the set of payoffs…
This paper proves several Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators, and provides two applications to zero-sum stochastic games where the total payoff is a weighted sum of the stage payoffs. The first application is to provide…
This paper extends the work done by Angela Siegel on subtraction games in which the subtraction set is N \ X for some finite set X. Siegel proves that for any finite set X, the G-sequence is ultimately arithmetic periodic, and that if |X| =…
We consider a sequential inspection game where an inspector uses a limited number of inspections over a larger number of time periods to detect a violation (an illegal act) of an inspectee. Compared with earlier models, we allow varying…
We introduce a new combinatorial game, named Triangle Game. In this game, a directed $3$-cycle graph is given, and tokens are placed on each vertex. The player chooses an edge and takes at least one token from the initial vertex. At the…
Learning in games has emerged as a powerful tool for machine learning with numerous applications. Quantum games model interactions between strategic players who have access to quantum resources, and several recent works have studied…
This paper develops an algorithm for upper- and lower-bounding the value function for a class of linear time-varying games subject to convex control sets. In particular, a two-player zero-sum differential game is considered where the…
Zeckendorf proved that any positive integer has a unique decomposition as a sum of non-consecutive Fibonacci numbers, indexed by $F_1 = 1, F_2 = 2, F_{n+1} = F_n + F_{n-1}$. Motivated by this result, Baird, Epstein, Flint, and Miller…
We study the periodicity of nim-sequences for subtraction games having subtraction sets with three elements. In particular, we give solutions in several cases, and we describe how these subtraction sets can be augmented by additional…
We show the existence and effective computability of optimal winning strategies for request-response games in case the quality of a play is measured by the limit superior of the mean accumulated waiting times between requests and their…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…
This paper considers the problem of two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls in finite horizon under rather weak assumptions on the cost functions ($c$ and $\chi$ not decreasing in time).…