Related papers: Near-Optimal Communication Lower Bounds for Approx…
We derive sublinear-time quantum algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of two-player zero-sum games, based on efficient Gibbs sampling methods. We are able to achieve speed-ups for both dense and sparse payoff matrices at the cost…
Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in multi-agent dynamic games require availability of all players' state information to compute control actions. However, in real-world scenarios, sensing and communication limitations between agents make…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
We study the problem of computing stationary Nash equilibria in discounted perfect information stochastic games from the viewpoint of computational complexity. For two-player games we prove the problem to be in PPAD, which together with a…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
In this paper we prove lower bounds on randomized multiparty communication complexity, both in the \emph{blackboard model} (where each message is written on a blackboard for all players to see) and (mainly) in the \emph{message-passing…
We show that there is a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing Nash equilibria in anonymous games with any fixed number of strategies (a very broad and important class of games), extending the two-strategy result of Daskalakis…
We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure Nash equilibria arising when random…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
We consider the problem of computing stationary points in min-max optimization, with a particular focus on the special case of computing Nash equilibria in (two-)team zero-sum games. We first show that computing $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria…
We extend the study of the complexity of finding an $\eps$-approximate Nash equilibrium in congestion games from the case of positive delay functions to delays of arbitrary sign. We first prove that in symmetric games with $\alpha$-bounded…
We prove that computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium of a win-lose bimatrix game with constant sparsity is PPAD-hard for inverse-polynomial $\epsilon$. Our result holds for 3-sparse games, which is tight given that 2-sparse…
In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…
Motivated by the fact that in many game-theoretic settings, the game analyzed is only an approximation to the game being played, in this work we analyze equilibrium computation for the broad and natural class of bimatrix games that are…
We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, although its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all…
This paper considers a distributed gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in networked games on graphs. In such games a player's cost function may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. An interference graph is…
The number of Nash equilibria of the mixed extension of a generic finite game in normal form is finite and odd. This raises the question how large the number can be, depending on the number of players and the numbers of their pure…
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…