Related papers: Near-Optimal Communication Lower Bounds for Approx…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
For all $n, \epsilon >0$, we show that the set of Poisson Binomial distributions on $n$ variables admits a proper $\epsilon$-cover in total variation distance of size $n^2+n \cdot (1/\epsilon)^{O(\log^2 (1/\epsilon))}$, which can also be…
The paper shows that smooth fictitious play converges to a neighborhood of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1 in almost all $N\times 2$ ($N$-player, two-action) potential games. The neighborhood of convergence may be made…
Upper bounds on the communication complexity of finding the nearest lattice point in a given lattice $\Lambda \subset \mathbb{R}^2$ was considered in earlier works~\cite{VB:2017}, for a two party, interactive communication model. Here we…
We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique…
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game theory that finds applications in various scientific and engineering disciplines. A non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game model is presented…
We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
In this paper, we investigate the learnability of the function approximator that approximates Nash equilibrium (NE) for games generated from a distribution. First, we offer a generalization bound using the Probably Approximately Correct…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
We design a distributed algorithm for learning Nash equilibria over time-varying communication networks in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can access its own cost function and local feasible set, but can only…
In this paper we consider continuity of the set of Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria for parameterized games. For parameterized games with unique Nash equilibria, the continuity of this equilibrium mapping is well-known.…
We give a tight lower bound of Omega(\sqrt{n}) for the randomized one-way communication complexity of the Boolean Hidden Matching Problem [BJK04]. Since there is a quantum one-way communication complexity protocol of O(\log n) qubits for…
We study a class of games with a continuum of players for which Cournot-Nash equilibria can be obtained by the minimisation of some cost, related to optimal transport. This cost is not convex in the usual sense in general but it turns out…
The Collision problem is to decide whether a given list of numbers $(x_1,\ldots,x_n)\in[n]^n$ is $1$-to-$1$ or $2$-to-$1$ when promised one of them is the case. We show an $n^{\Omega(1)}$ randomised communication lower bound for the natural…
In this work, we investigate an application of a Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm in a social network. In a networked game each player (user) takes action in response to other players' actions in order to decrease (increase) his cost…
We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…
We consider a game in which each player must find a compromise between more daring strategies that carry a high risk for him to be eliminated, and more cautious ones that, however, reduce his final score. For two symmetric players this game…