Related papers: The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionari…
In this paper, we first devise two algorithms to determine whether or not a bimatrix game has a strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If so, we propose an algorithm that computes the strategically equivalent zero-sum game. If a given…
Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Although they have been widely studied, almost all previous work on Nash equilibria in Boolean games…
In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
We address the question of whether price of stability results (existence of equilibria with low social cost) are robust to incomplete information. We show that this is the case in potential games, if the underlying algorithmic social cost…
We revisit the complexity of deciding, given a {\it bimatrix game,} whether it has a {\it Nash equilibrium} with certain natural properties; such decision problems were early known to be ${\mathcal{NP}}$-hard~\cite{GZ89}. We show that…
We investigate the complexity of bounding the uncertainty of graphical games, and we provide new insight into the intrinsic difficulty of computing Nash equilibria. In particular, we show that, if one adds very simple and natural additional…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
This paper depicts algorithms for solving the decision Boolean Satisfiability Problem. An extreme problem is formulated to analyze the complexity of algorithms and the complexity for solving it. A novel and easy reformulation as a lottery…
We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibria in large random bi-matrix games. Using techniques of disordered systems theory we compute the statistical properties of both, the fixed…
The evolution of preferences that account for other agents' fitness, or other-regarding preferences, has been modeled with the "indirect approach" to evolutionary game theory. Under the indirect evolutionary approach, agents make decisions…
We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…
The Nash Equilibrium is a much discussed, deceptively complex, method for the analysis of non-cooperative games. If one reads many of the commonly available definitions the description of the Nash Equilibrium is deceptively simple in…
Finding, counting, or determining the existence of Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given each others' actions, are known to be computational intractable problems. We ask whether weakening optimality to the requirement…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A…
We define solution concepts appropriate for computationally bounded players playing a fixed finite game. To do so, we need to define what it means for a \emph{computational game}, which is a sequence of games that get larger in some…
This paper proposes a co-evolutionary model of directed graphs and three opinions, i.e., conservative$(+)$, neutral$(\odot)$ and liberal$(-)$. Agents update both opinions and social relationships with bias. We find that an emergent game…