Related papers: The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionari…
Finite-horizon probabilistic multiagent concurrent game systems, also known as finite multiplayer stochastic games, are a well-studied model in computer science due to their ability to represent a wide range of real-world scenarios…
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in classical game theory is a refinement of Nash equilibrium concept. We investigate the consequences when a small group of mutants using quantum strategies try to invade a classical ESS in a population…
The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
Performative prediction captures the phenomenon where deploying a predictive model shifts the underlying data distribution. While simple retraining dynamics are known to converge linearly when the performative effects are weak ($\rho < 1$),…
The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…
We study the computational complexity of strategic behaviour in primary elections. Unlike direct voting systems, primaries introduce a multi-stage process in which voters first influence intra-party nominees before a general election…
Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable…
In bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum states…
We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium. We…
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…
It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…
We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect information recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is Existential…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new approach to evaluate ESS in…
Inspired by real world examples, e.g. the Internet, researchers have introduced an abundance of strategic games to study natural phenomena in networks. Unfortunately, almost all of these games have the conceptual drawback of being…
In stochastic dynamical systems, different concepts of stability can be obtained in different limits. A particularly interesting example is evolutionary game theory, which is traditionally based on infinite populations, where strict Nash…
Motivated by the fact that in many game-theoretic settings, the game analyzed is only an approximation to the game being played, in this work we analyze equilibrium computation for the broad and natural class of bimatrix games that are…
We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…