Stability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum games
Quantum Physics
2007-05-23 v4 Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
Abstract
In bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.quant-ph/0106056,
title = {Stability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum games},
author = {A. Iqbal and A. H. Toor},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:quant-ph/0106056},
year = {2007}
}
Comments
8 pages, no figure, to appear in Communications in Theoretical Physics