Related papers: The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionari…
We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
Exploiting the algebraic structure of the set of bimatrix games, a divide-and-conquer algorithm for finding Nash equilibria is proposed. The algorithm is fixed-parameter tractable with the size of the largest irreducible component of a game…
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…
We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between…
We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…
Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game obtained by deleting/adding a subset of the strategies that…
We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential…
We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…
Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact…
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was originally defined as a static concept but later given a dynamic characterization. A well known theorem in evolutionary game theory says that an ESS is an attractor of replicator dynamics but not…
Exploiting the algebraic structure of the set of bimatrix games, a divide-and-conquer algorithm for finding Nash equilibria is proposed. The algorithm is fixed-parameter tractable with the size of the largest irreducible component of a game…
The distributed computation of Nash equilibria is assuming growing relevance in engineering where such problems emerge in the context of distributed control. Accordingly, we present schemes for computing equilibria of two classes of static…
We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on…
We establish that the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) threshold problem for mean-payoff games is NP-complete. While the SPE threshold problem was recently shown to be decidable (in doubly exponential time) and NP-hard, its exact worst…
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…
The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form games, computing a proper equilibrium is known to be…
We design a distributed algorithm to seek generalized Nash equilibria of a robust game with uncertain coupled constraints. Due to the uncertainty of parameters in set constraints, we aim to find a generalized Nash equilibrium in the worst…
We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in general-sum games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large in a natrual representation of the problem. In…