Related papers: Monotone bargaining is Nash-solvable
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
We prove that computing a Nash equilibrium of a two-player ($n \times n$) game with payoffs in $[-1,1]$ is PPAD-hard (under randomized reductions) even in the smoothed analysis setting, smoothing with noise of constant magnitude. This gives…
This paper considers dyadic-exchange networks in which individual agents autonomously form coalitions of size two and agree on how to split a transferable utility. Valid results for this game include stable (if agents have no unilateral…
In this paper, we focus on deriving some sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions to non-monotone Variational Inequalities (VIs) based on inverse mapping theory. We have obtained several widely applicable sufficient conditions…
We consider graphical $n$-person games with perfect information that have no Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. Solving these games in mixed strategies, we introduce probabilistic distributions in all non-terminal positions. The…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…
We formulate a conjecture from graph theory that is equivalent to Nash-solvability of the finite two-person shortest path games with positive local costs. For the three-person games such conjecture fails.
In this paper, the problem of finding a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of a networked game is studied. Players are only able to choose their decisions from a feasible action set. The feasible set is considered to be a private linear…
Playing a symmetric bi-matrix game is usually physically implemented by sharing pairs of 'objects' between two players. A new setting is proposed that explicitly shows effects of quantum correlations between the pairs on the structure of…
Congestion games are attractive because they can model many concrete situations where some competing entities interact through the use of some shared resources, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibria which correspond to the…
In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…
We introduce a class of Bayesian bidding games for which we prove that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a (non-empty) sublattice and we give a sufficient condition for uniqueness that is often verified in the context of markets with…
We consider the problem of approximating Nash equilibria of $N$ functions $f_1,\dots, f_N$ of $N$ variables. In particular, we deduce conditions under which systems of the form $$ \dot u_j(t)=-\nabla_{x_j}f_j(u(t)) $$ $(j=1,\dots, N)$ are…
We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, and Player C does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for $i=A, B, C$.…
We study the following communication variant of local search. There is some fixed, commonly known graph $G$. Alice holds $f_A$ and Bob holds $f_B$, both are functions that specify a value for each vertex. The goal is to find a local maximum…
We study the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria $\mathcal X_\star \times \mathcal Y_\star$ in two-player zero-sum matrix games. Fearnley and Savani (2016) showed that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an $n…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We consider the class of two-person ordinal potential games where each player has the same number of actions $K$. Each game in this class admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium and the best-response dynamics converges to one of these…
We observe that a significant class of Nash equilibrium problems in non-potential games can be associated with monotone inclusion problems. We propose splitting techniques to solve such problems and establish their convergence. Applications…
The Nash equilibrium problem is a widely used tool to model non-cooperative games. Many solution methods have been proposed in the literature to compute solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with continuous strategy sets, but, besides some…