Related papers: Communicating Zero-Sum Product Stochastic Games

We study multidimensional cheap talk with simple language and aligned preferences. An expert communicates with a decision-maker using a score that aggregates a multidimensional state into a one-dimensional message. Even though the expert…

We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…

We analyze the convergence properties of the two-timescale fictitious play combining the classical fictitious play with the Q-learning for two-player zero-sum stochastic games with player-dependent learning rates. We show its almost sure…

We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was…

We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that…

Many emerging problems involve teams of agents taking part in a game. Such problems require a stochastic analysis with regard to the correlation structures among the agents belonging to a given team. In the context of Standard Borel spaces,…

We consider a zero-sum stochastic differential game over elementary mixed feed-back strategies. These are strategies based only on the knowledge of the past state, randomized continuously in time from a sampling distribution which is kept…

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide…

Bewley and Kohlberg (1976) and Mertens and Neyman (1981) have proved, respectively, the existence of the asymptotic value and the uniform value in zero-sum stochastic games with finite state space and finite action sets. In their work, the…

We study the ergodicity of deterministic two-person zero-sum differential games. This property is defined by the uniform convergence to a constant of either the infinite-horizon discounted value as the discount factor tends to zero, or…

In the present paper we consider one class of zero-sum games with discontinuous payoffs which may have no solutions in the sets of pure or mixed strategies. We show that, however, the solution always exists in the set of so-called $\mathcal…

The article introduces a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and proposes two logical systems with modality "coalition has a strategy to transition to a non-failure state with a given probability while achieving a given goal."…

In \emph{zero-sum two-player hidden stochastic games}, players observe partial information about the state. We address: $(i)$ the existence of the \emph{uniform value}, i.e., a limiting average payoff that both players can guarantee for…

This work studies the behaviors of two large-population teams competing in a discrete environment. The team-level interactions are modeled as a zero-sum game while the agent dynamics within each team is formulated as a collaborative…

In this paper, we formulate a two-player zero-sum game under dynamic constraints defined by hybrid dynamical equations. The game consists of a min-max problem involving a cost functional that depends on the actions and resulting solutions…

Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…

Shapley (1953) introduced two-player zero-sum discounted stochastic games, henceforth stochastic games, a model where a state variable follows a two-controlled Markov chain, the players receive rewards at each stage which add up to $0$, and…

We consider a finite-horizon, zero-sum game in which both players control a stochastic differential equation by invoking impulses. We derive a control randomization formulation of the game and use the existence of a value for the randomized…

Within the context of video games the notion of perfectly rational agents can be undesirable as it leads to uninteresting situations, where humans face tough adversarial decision makers. Current frameworks for stochastic games and…

In this paper we model a game such that all strategies are non-revealing, with imperfect recall and incomplete information. We also introduce a modified sliding-block code as a linear transformation which generates common knowledge of how…