Related papers: Communicating Zero-Sum Product Stochastic Games
In this paper we define a new model of limited communication for multiplayer team games of imperfect information. We prove that the Team DFA Game and Team Formula Game, which have bounded state, remain undecidable when players have a rate…
We present a novel variant of fictitious play dynamics combining classical fictitious play with Q-learning for stochastic games and analyze its convergence properties in two-player zero-sum stochastic games. Our dynamics involves players…
We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…
In this paper we study the nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time which is a two player non-cooperative game on stopping times. We show that it has a Nash equilibrium point for general stochastic processes. As an application, we…
In statistical decision theory involving a single decision-maker, an information structure is said to be better than another one if for any cost function involving a hidden state variable and an action variable which is restricted to be…
We study nonzero-sum stochastic switching games. Two players compete for market dominance through controlling (via timing options) the discrete-state market regime $M$. Switching decisions are driven by a continuous stochastic factor $X$…
We study the asymptotic value of a frequency-dependent zero-sum game with separable payoff following a differential approach. The stage payoffs in such games depend on the current actions and on a linear function of the frequency of actions…
A basic question for zero-sum repeated games consists in determining whether the mean payoff per time unit is independent of the initial state. In the special case of "zero-player" games, i.e., of Markov chains equipped with additive…
We consider repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on the side of Player 2 with the total payoff given by the non-normalized sum of stage gains. In the classical examples the value $V_N$ of such an $N$-stage game is of the…
The paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. We investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity, and the limit of value functions of…
We study a class of nonzero-sum stochastic differential games between two teams with agents in each team interacting through graphon aggregates. On the one hand, in each large population group, agents act together to optimize a common…
Two-player zero-sum "graph games" are a central model, which proceeds as follows. A token is placed on a vertex of a graph, and the two players move it to produce an infinite "play", which determines the winner or payoff of the game.…
We study a wireless jamming problem consisting of the competition between a legitimate receiver and a jammer, as a zero-sum game where the value to maximize/minimize is the channel capacity at the receiver's side. Most of the approaches…
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…
We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategiesintwo-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions.We show that the existenceof such…
Two-player zero-sum games are a well-established model for synthesising controllers that optimise some performance criterion. In such games one player represents the controller, while the other describes the (adversarial) environment, and…
We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
We generalize the results of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) on zero sum stochastic differential games to the case when the controls are unbounded. We do this by proving a dynamic programming principle using a covering argument instead of…
We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…