Related papers: Demand-Independent Optimal Tolls
The objective of this paper is to initiate a qualitative analysis of dynamic flow in traffic networks by using the competitive equilibrium model of multiple market systems. A network is modeled as a dynamic graph where routes (edges) are…
Here, we examine the Wardrop equilibrium model on networks with flow-dependent costs and its connection with stationary mean-field games (MFG). In the first part of this paper, we present the Wardrop and the first-order MFG models on…
Congestion pricing policies have emerged as promising traffic management tools to alleviate traffic congestion caused by travelers' selfish routing behaviors. The core principle behind deploying tolls is to impose monetary costs on…
The effective design and management of public transport systems are essential to ensure the best service for users. The performance of a transport system will depend heavily on user behaviour. In the common-lines problem approach, users…
Tolling, or congestion pricing, has emerged as an effective tool for preventing gridlock in traffic systems. However, tolls are currently mostly designed on route-based traffic assignment models (TAM), which may be unrealistic and…
The paper investigates the throughput behavior of single-commodity dynamical flow networks governed by monotone distributed routing policies. The networks are modeled as systems of ODEs based on mass conversation laws on directed graphs…
Congestion pricing has emerged as an effective tool for mitigating traffic congestion, yet implementing welfare or revenue-optimal dynamic tolls is often impractical. Most real-world congestion pricing deployments, including New York City's…
This paper studies the problem of optimal flow control in dynamic inventory systems. A dynamic optimal distribution problem, including time-varying supply and demand, capacity constraints on the transportation lines, and convex flow cost…
This paper proposes a dynamic congestion pricing model that takes into account mobile source emissions. We consider a tollable vehicular network where the users selfishly minimize their own travel costs, including travel time, early/late…
We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of theory as well as real world data. First, we introduce a new type of games: $\theta$-free flow games. Here, commuters only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow…
Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…
Toll optimization in a large-scale dynamic traffic network is typically characterized by an expensive-to-evaluate objective function. In this paper, we propose two toll level problems (TLPs) integrated with a large-scale simulation-based…
This paper investigates the impacts of competition in autonomous mobility-on-demand systems. By adopting a network-flow based formulation, we first determine the optimal strategies of profit-maximizing platform operators in monopoly and…
Traffic congestion has lead to an increasing emphasis on management measures for a more efficient utilization of existing infrastructure. In this context, this paper proposes a novel framework that integrates real-time optimization of…
This paper presents a model addressing welfare optimal policies of demand responsive transportation service, where passengers cause external travel time costs for other passengers due to the route changes. Optimal pricing and trip…
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We…
Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of subsidies and tolls in incentivizing user behavior in congestion games. The predominantly studied method of influencing user…
As an example for the optimization of unstable flows, we present an economics-based method for deciding the optimal rates at which vehicles are allowed to enter a highway. It exploits the naturally occuring fluctuations of traffic flow and…
We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which…
Route controlled autonomous vehicles could have a significant impact in reducing congestion in the future. Before applying multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms to route control, we can model the system using a congestion game to…