Related papers: Demand-Independent Optimal Tolls
The inefficiency of the Wardrop equilibrium of nonatomic routing games can be eliminated by placing tolls on the edges of a network so that the socially optimal flow is induced as an equilibrium flow. A solution where the minimum number of…
We consider a network pricing game on a parallel network with congestion effects in which link owners set tolls for travel so as to maximize profit. A central authority is able to regulate this competition by means of a (uniform) price cap.…
We study transportation networks controlled by dynamical feedback tolls. We consider a multiscale transportation network model whereby the dynamics of the traffic flows are intertwined with those of the drivers' route choices. The latter…
We consider the following question: in a nonatomic routing game, can the tolls that induce the minimum latency flow be computed without knowing the latency functions? Since the latency functions are unknown, we assume we are given an oracle…
A seminal result of [Fleischer et al. and Karakostas and Kolliopulos, both FOCS 2004] states that system optimal multi-commodity static network flows are always implementable as tolled Wardrop equilibrium flows even if users have…
The analysis of network routing games typically assumes, right at the onset, precise and detailed information about the latency functions. Such information may, however, be unavailable or difficult to obtain. Moreover, one is often…
When selfish users share a road network and minimize their individual travel costs, the equilibrium they reach can be worse than the socially optimal routing. Tolls are often used to mitigate this effect in traditional congestion games,…
We study transportation networks controlled by dynamic feedback tolls. We focus on a multiscale model whereby the dynamics of the traffic flows are intertwined with those of the routing choices. The latter are influenced by the current…
We study a dynamic routing game motivated by traffic flows. The base model for an edge is the Vickrey bottleneck model. That is, edges are equipped with a free flow transit time and a capacity. When the inflow into an edge exceeds its…
Flows over time have received substantial attention from both an optimization and (more recently) a game-theoretic perspective. In this model, each arc has an associated delay for traversing the arc, and a bound on the rate of flow entering…
This paper studies the monotonicity of equilibrium costs and equilibrium loads in nonatomic congestion games, in response to variations of the demands. The main goal is to identify conditions under which a paradoxical non-monotone behavior…
The increasing complexity of urban transportation systems, driven by connected and automated vehicles, calls for new modeling paradigms and scalable control strategies. We propose a non-monetary control framework that leverages autonomous…
We study a network design problem (NDP) where the planner aims at selecting the optimal single-link intervention on a transportation network to minimize the travel time under Wardrop equilibrium flows. Our first result is that, if the delay…
This work analyzes the minimum tollbooth problem in atomic network congestion games with unsplittable flows. The goal is to place tolls on edges, such that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the tolled game that is a social optimum in…
This work explores the relationship between the set of Wardrop equilibria~(WE) of a routing game, the total demand of that game, and the occurrence of Braess's paradox~(BP). The BP formalizes the counter-intuitive fact that for some…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
Numerous networks, such as transportation, distribution and delivery networks optimize their designs in order to increase efficiency and lower costs, improving the stability of its intended functions, etc. Networks that distribute goods,…
Stability of Wardrop equilibria is analyzed for dynamical transportation networks in which the drivers' route choices are influenced by information at multiple temporal and spatial scales. The considered model involves a continuum of…
How to design tolls that induce socially optimal traffic loads with dynamically arriving travelers who make selfish routing decisions? We propose a two-timescale discrete-time stochastic dynamics that adaptively adjusts the toll prices on a…
We study a novel approach to information design in the standard traffic model of network congestion games. It captures the natural condition that the demand is unknown to the users of the network. A principal (e.g., a mobility service)…