Related papers: Demand-Independent Optimal Tolls
How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing.…
In this paper we consider a mean field approach to modeling the agents flow over a transportation network. In particular, beside a standard framework of mean field games, with controlled dynamics by the agents and costs mass-distribution…
In the classical Monge-Kantorovich problem, the transportation cost only depends on the amount of mass sent from sources to destinations and not on the paths followed by this mass. Thus, it does not allow for congestion effects. Using the…
Given the efficiency and equity concerns of a cordon toll, this paper proposes a few alternative distance-dependent area-based pricing models for a large-scale dynamic traffic network. We use the Network Fundamental Diagram (NFD) to monitor…
Tolling in traffic networks offers a popular measure to minimize overall congestion. Existing toll designs primarily focus on congestion in route-based traffic assignment models (TAMs), in which travelers make a single route selection from…
Under the Markov decision process (MDP) congestion game framework, we study the problem of enforcing population distribution constraints on a population of players with stochastic dynamics and coupled congestion costs. Existing research…
We consider the behavior of the price of anarchy and equilibrium flows in nonatomic multi-commodity routing games as a function of the traffic demand. We analyze their smoothness with a special attention to specific values of the demand at…
A Wardrop equilibrium for multiple routes requires equal travel time on each path used. With real-time traffic data regarding travel times, it is important to analyze how to use the information provided. In particular, can a Wardrop…
We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given…
We ask if it is possible to positively influence social behavior with no risk of unintentionally incentivizing pathological behavior. In network routing problems, if network traffic is composed of many individual agents, it is known that…
How can a system designer exploit system-level knowledge to derive incentives to optimally influence social behavior? The literature on network routing contains many results studying the application of monetary tolls to influence behavior…
Traditional non-atomic selfish routing games present some limitations in properly modeling road traffic. This paper introduces a novel type of non-atomic selfish routing game leveraging concepts from Daganzo's cell transmission model (CTM).…
We consider a discrete-time nonatomic routing game with variable demand and uncertain costs. Given a routing network with single origin and destination, the cost function of each edge depends on some uncertain persistent state parameter. At…
We consider the traffic assignment problem in nonatomic routing games where the players' cost functions may be subject to random fluctuations (e.g., weather disturbances, perturbations in the underlying network, etc.). We tackle this…
We introduce an optimum principle for a vehicular traffic network with road bottlenecks. This network breakdown minimization (BM) principle states that the network optimum is reached, when link flow rates are assigned in the network in such…
This paper is concerned with a conservation law model of traffic flow on a network of roads, where each driver chooses his own departure time in order to minimize the sum of a departure cost and an arrival cost. The model includes various…
Congestion pricing has become an effective instrument for traffic demand management on road networks. This paper proposes an optimal control approach for congestion pricing for day-to-day timescale that incorporates demand uncertainty and…
We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with remotely located players, to the counter intuitive Braess' paradox of traffic flow that is an important design consideration in generic networks where the addition…
Designing and optimizing different flows in networks is a relevant problem in many contexts. While a number of methods have been proposed in the physics and optimal transport literature for the one-commodity case, we lack similar results…
Traffic is a significant source of global carbon emissions. In this paper, we study how carbon pricing can be used to guide traffic towards equilibria that respect given emission budgets. In particular, we consider a general multi-commodity…