Related papers: Selfish Network Creation with Non-Uniform Edge Cos…
We consider nonatomic network games with one source and one destination. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we show that, under suitable…
This is the first paper to address the topology structure of Job Edge-Fog interconnection network in the perspective of network creation game. A two level network creation game model is given, in which the first level is similar to the…
A network creation game simulates a decentralized and non-cooperative building of a communication network. Informally, there are $n$ players sitting on the network nodes, which attempt to establish a reciprocal communication by activating,…
In this paper we study a generalization of the classic \emph{network creation game} in the scenario in which the $n$ players sit on a given arbitrary \emph{host graph}, which constrains the set of edges a player can activate at a cost of…
We study non-atomic congestion games on parallel-link networks with affine cost functions. We investigate the power of machine-learned predictions in the design of coordination mechanisms aimed at minimizing the impact of selfishness. Our…
We live in a world full of networks where our economy, our communication, and even our social life crucially depends on them. These networks typically emerge from the interaction of many entities, which is why researchers study agent-based…
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We…
We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improve their communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network. The $n$ nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway to the…
We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
We investigate the behavior of a large number of selfish users that are able to switch dynamically between multiple wireless access-points (possibly belonging to different standards) by introducing an iterated non-cooperative game. Users…
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more…
We investigate packet routing games in which network users selfishly route themselves through a network over discrete time, aiming to reach the destination as quickly as possible. Conflicts due to limited capacities are resolved by the…
We study the structure and evolution of the Internet's Autonomous System (AS) interconnection topology as a game with heterogeneous players. In this network formation game, the utility of a player depends on the network structure, e.g., the…
We introduce a simple network formation model for social networks. Agents are nodes, connecting to another agent by building a directed edge (or accepting a connection from another agent) has a cost, and reaching (or being reached by) other…
In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that…
We study the sum classic network creation game introduced by Fabrikant et al. in which $n$ players conform a network buying links at individual price $\alpha$. When studying this model we are mostly interested in \emph{Nash equilibria}…
We study strong equilibria in network creation games. These form a classical and well-studied class of games where a set of players form a network by buying edges to their neighbors at a cost of a fixed parameter $\alpha$. The cost of a…
We consider the well-studied game-theoretic version of machine scheduling in which jobs correspond to self-interested users and machines correspond to resources. Here each user chooses a machine trying to minimize her own cost, and such…