The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two
Computer Science and Game Theory
2012-10-02 v1
Abstract
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first sharp bound for the maximum latency objective.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1210.0230,
title = {The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two},
author = {Xujin Chen and Benjamin Doerr and Xiaodong Hu and Weidong Ma and Rob van Stee and Carola Winzen},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1210.0230},
year = {2012}
}
Comments
Full version of WINE 2012 paper, 24 pages