Related papers: A Bayesian Game without epsilon equilibria
This short note demonstrates how one can define a transformation of a non-zero sum game into a zero sum, so that the optimal mixed strategy achieving equilibrium always exists. The transformation is equivalent to introduction of a passive…
We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…
We demonstrate a Bayesian quantum game on an ion trap quantum computer with five qubits. The players share an entangled pair of qubits and perform rotations on their qubit as the strategy choice. Two five-qubit circuits are sufficient to…
A fair gambling is hard to be made between two spatially separated parties without introducing a trusted third party. Here we propose a novel gambling protocol, which enables fair gambling between two distant parties without the help of a…
This paper considers games where the utilities for agents are the sum of a term proportional to a social utility, and another term that is an individual cost or reward. The agents are assumed to be irrational in their perception of the…
We develop a new method for stochastic optimization using the Bayesian statistics approach. More precisely, we optimize parameters of chess engines as those data are available to us, but the method should apply to all situations where we…
We study the computational complexity of solving stochastic games with mean-payoff objectives. Instead of identifying special classes in which simple strategies are sufficient to play $\epsilon$-optimally, or form $\epsilon$-Nash…
We describe an efficient algorithm to compute solutions for the general two-player Blotto game on n battlefields with heterogeneous values. While explicit constructions for such solutions have been limited to specific, largely symmetric or…
Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii (Berge-Zhukovskii) is an alternate solution concept in non-cooperative game theory that formalizes cooperation in a noncooperative setting. In this paper the epsilon-Berge-Zhukovskii equilibrium…
Cooperative games with nonempty core are called balanced, and the set of balanced games is a polyhedron. Given a game with empty core, we look for the closest balanced game, in the sense of the (weighted) Euclidean distance, i.e., the…
We initiate the study of Bayesian conversations, which model interactive communication between two strategic agents without a mediator. We compare this to communication through a mediator and investigate the settings in which a mediation…
We prove that finding an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a succinctly representable game with many players is PPAD-hard for constant epsilon. Our proof uses succinct games, i.e. games whose payoff function is represented by a circuit. Our…
A quantum version of the Minority game for an arbitrary number of agents is considered. It is known that when the number of agents is odd, quantizing the game produces no advantage to the players, but for an even number of agents new Nash…
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other…
The design of Nash equilibrium seeking strategies for games in which the involved players are of second-order integrator-type dynamics is investigated in this paper. Noticing that velocity signals are usually noisy or not available for…
In a recent paper, Eisert et al. presented a quantum mechanical generalization of Prisoner's Dilemma. They asserted that the maximally entangled game exhibits a unique Nash equilibrium which yields a pay-off equivalent to cooperative…
The $\varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than $\varepsilon$ to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed…
We generalize Ebert's Hat Problem for three persons and three colors. All players guess simultaneously the color of their own hat observing only the hat colors of the other players. It is also allowed for each player to pass: no color is…
We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…
We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…